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AbsTRACT
On December 17, 2010, a young Tunisian street vendor protesting an abusive police 
official set off a wave of democratic uprisings throughout the Arab world.  In rising 
up against their governments, the peoples of the Arab countries were confronting 
an age-old problem in political theory: When is it acceptable to rise up against an 
unjust authority?  This question is not only of great importance to the peoples of the 
Middle East today but was also of profound interest to the American founders and, 
through them, has informed the very basis of modern constitutionalism.  It is perhaps 
unsurprising then that many countries’ constitutions allow the people to challenge or 
overthrow their governments under certain circumstances.  But to date, little systematic 
and empirical analysis has been done on the prevalence of this so-called right to resist 
in national constitutions or on what motivates constitutionmakers to adopt such a right.
This Article takes up the task.  It presents an original dataset on right-to-resist 
provisions in all national constitutions written since 1781, tracing such provisions’ 
historical trajectory and demonstrating how they have proliferated in recent decades. 
The Article moreover provides the first-ever empirical exploration of why it is, exactly, 
that constitutionmakers give their people a constitutional mandate to overthrow 
or contradict their governing authorities—likely those very authorities elsewhere 
empowered by the same constitution.  Drawing on a range of real-world examples as 
well as regression analysis, we show that right-to-resist provisions are most likely to 
be first established following a disruption of the previous constitutional order, either 
through popular democratic transition or through a violent political break such as coup 
d’état.
These findings suggest that the constitutional right to resist serves a dual function, 
depending on its context.  On the one hand, the constitutional right to resist can 
represent a fundamentally democratic and forward-looking tool that constrains 
future government abuse, empowers the national citizenry, and acts as an insurance 
policy against undemocratic backsliding.  On the other hand, the right can serve as 
a backward-looking justification for coupmakers who seek retroactive legitimacy for 
whatever political crimes placed them in a position to make a new constitution in 
the first place.  Which of these two functions prevails may be in large part regionally 
determined.  Latin American constitutionmakers primarily adopted the right to resist 
in the aftermath of coups d’état, while in other parts of the world the right to resist 
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functions as a precommitment device against undemocratic backsliding.
Our findings have significant implications for our broader understanding of 
constitutionalism.  Ostensibly, at the heart of any constitution lies a wish to bind the 
future on behalf of the present.  Yet our findings suggest that, at least in some cases, 
constitutional provisions may also serve the function of reinterpreting and justifying the 
past.  At least as far as the right to resist is concerned, constitutions are as much about 
yesterday as they are about tomorrow.
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INTRODUCTION 
On December 17, 2010, a young Tunisian street vendor protesting an abu-
sive police official set off a wave of democratic uprisings throughout the Arab 
world.1  In contrast with externally imposed regime changes in Afghanistan and 
Iraq,2 the long-suffering Arab peoples took it on themselves to drive their former 
rulers from power and called for a new basis of governance in a region long domi-
nated by dictators.3  While the outcomes of these political transitions are still very 
much in question, they highlighted the importance of popular revolt in bringing 
about democratic change.4 
The peoples of the Arab Spring were confronting an age-old problem in 
political theory: Under what circumstances is it acceptable to rise up against an 
unjust government?  In Bronze Age China, notions of legitimate popular upris-
ings served as an important potential curb over otherwise formidable imperial 
authority.5  Since then, the same question has plagued or empowered Islamic 
  
1. See Kareem Fahim, Slap to a Man’s Pride Set Off Tumult in Tunisia, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/22/world/africa/22sidi.html (describing how, after police 
officials confiscated his produce, street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi set himself on fire in front of the 
governor’s high gate in protest, which subsequently sparked the revolution in Tunisia as well as the 
uprisings throughout the Arab states). 
2. See, e.g., Zachary Elkins et al., Baghdad, Tokyo, Kabul . . . : Constitution Making in Occupied States, 49 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1139, 1141 (2008) (noting that the Iraqi constitution was drafted with 
“substantial assistance by the U.S. government”); Noah Feldman, Imposed Constitutionalism, 37 
CONN. L. REV. 857, 858–59 (2005) (noting that the constitutions of Afghanistan and Iraq were 
drafted with “substantial intervention and pressure imposed from outside to produce constitutional 
outcomes preferred by international actors, including NATO, the United Nations, and interna-
tional NGOs, as well as foreign states like the United States and Germany”).  See generally David S. 
Law & Mila Versteeg, The Evolution and Ideology of Global Constitutionalism, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 
1163 (2011) (finding empirical evidence that constitutions are standardized documents and hypo-
thesizing that this is the result of various types of transnational influence); Benedikt Goderis & 
Mila Versteeg, Transnational Constitutions (CentER Discussion Paper Series No. 2013-010) (Apr. 
2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2216582 (finding empirical evidence of transnational 
influences in constitutional design). 
3. See Fouad Ajami, The Arab Spring at One: A Year of Living Dangerously, FOREIGN AFF., Mar.–
Apr. 2012, at 56, 56, 58 (noting that before the uprisings, the Arabs felt as if “they were cursed, 
doomed to despotism,” and that though Egypt is “[o]ften written off as the quintessential land of 
political submission,” the people throughout the Middle East were able to “[rise] up against their 
sclerotic masters”). 
4. See, e.g., Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, 
Inequality, and Growth in Historical Perspective, 115 Q.J. ECON. 1167, 1167, 1182–86 (2000) 
(theorizing that western democratization has historically come about through revolution, or at least 
the threat of a revolution, and that the franchise was extended “as strategic decisions by the political 
elite to prevent widespread social unrest and revolution”). 
5. See infra Part III.A (discussing the Chinese tradition and the conceptualization of the right to resist 
in the works of the philosopher Mencius). 
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caliphs, medieval princes, and modern-day despots and democrats in turn.  
Likewise, for early democratic movements in the eighteenth century, this idea of 
righteous revolution served as a powerful and unifying raison d’état.6  Indeed, the 
question of when to overthrow government authority was of such profound im-
portance to the American founders that it today stands at the very basis of 
modern constitutionalism as we know it.7 
It is perhaps unsurprising then that many constitutions themselves provide a 
basis for such uprisings.  Constitutional provisions allowing individuals to disre-
gard or even attack the governing laws and structures go back at least to the French 
and American Revolutions.8  Their purpose seems to be to remind governors that 
the people are the ultimate source of legitimate rule and to help diverse popu-
lations to coordinate to limit the powers of their rulers. 
However, these clauses may also have a dark side.  While the language of 
justified resistance can function to ensure the ultimate enforcement of democracy 
  
6. For examples of how the right to resist featured in early democratic movements in France and 
America, see, for example, THOMAS JEFFERSON, To William Stephens Smith, in THOMAS 
JEFFERSON: POLITICAL WRITINGS 109, 110 (Joyce Appleby & Terence Ball eds., 1999) (“God 
forbid we should ever be 20 years without such a rebellion. . . . [W]hat country can preserve it’s [sic] 
liberties if their [sic] rulers are not warned from time to time that their people preserve the spirit of 
resistance?  Let them take arms.  The remedy is to set them right as to facts, pardon & pacify them.  
What signify a few lives lost in a century or two?  The tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to 
time with the blood of patriots & tyrants.  It is it’s [sic] natural manure.”), 5 JOURNALS OF THE 
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 690 (Worthington Chauncey Ford ed., 1906) 
(“Rebellion to Tyrants is Obedience to God.”), and 5 THOMAS PAINE, Dissertation on First 
Principles of Government, in THE LIFE AND WORKS OF THOMAS PAINE 207, 225 (William M. 
Van der Weyde ed., 1925) (“It is possible to exclude men from the right of voting, but it is im-
possible to exclude them from the right of rebelling against that exclusion; and when all other rights 
are taken away the right of rebellion is made perfect.”). 
7. See infra Part II (providing a historical overview of the right to resist in different societies, including 
how this right featured in the thinking of the American founders). 
8. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“That whenever any Form of 
Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, 
and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers 
in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.  Prudence, 
indeed, will dictate that Governments long established should not be changed for light and trans-
ient causes; and accordingly all experience hath shewn, that mankind are more disposed to suffer, 
while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accus-
tomed.  But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object 
evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw 
off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future security.”); DECLARATION OF 
THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND OF THE CITIZEN OF 26 AUGUST 1789 art. 2 (Fr.), translated in 2 
MARTINUS NIJHOFF, CONSTITUTIONS OF NATIONS: FRANCE TO NEW ZEALAND 20 
(1956) (“The purpose of all civil associations is the preservation of the natural and imprescriptible 
rights of man.  These rights are liberty, property, security, and resistance to oppression.”).  
According to our data, about twenty percent of all constitutions contain such a right today.  See 
infra Figure 1. 
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and the defense of the constitution, it can also serve as a justification for earlier 
unconstitutional acts of resistance.  Regimes led by coupmakers such as Jerry 
Rawlings in Ghana and by alumni of failed coups such as Hugo Chavez in 
Venezuela have introduced the right to resist in their constitutions.9  Clauses of 
this nature have become increasingly popular as despots and freedom fighters 
alike have invoked them to justify the past.10 
Despite the centrality of this so-called right to resist in political theory, we 
have, until now, possessed little empirical knowledge on the prevalence of this 
right in national constitutional texts.11  As such, we lacked basic information 
about how many constitutions have adopted the right, whether there are any 
contextual patterns to adoption, and what (if any) the consequences of that adop-
tion may be.  Without this information, we could not even begin to theorize why 
the right is included in some constitutions and not others. 
This Article takes up the task.  It presents original data, derived from coding 
every national constitution written since 1781, on right-to-resist provisions in 
global constitutional history.12  With this data, this Article traces the develop-
ment of this right within the world’s written constitutions over a 230-year period, 
and it draws attention to the right’s proliferation over the past five decades.  It also 
conducts a textual analysis of all current and historical provisions granting a right 
to resist, identifying some important variations within the scope, wording, and 
justifications of such provisions and setting out an analytical framework for 
classifying them.  Our main purpose, however, is to explain why some constitu-
tionmakers would paradoxically give their own people a constitutional mandate 
to overthrow the very governments they create.  Drawing on a range of real-world 
examples as well as regression analysis, we find that right-to-resist provisions serve 
a dual function: as both forward-looking promises not to abuse the citizenry and 
backward-looking justifications for retroactively blessing questionable events that 
may have led to the constitutionmaking itself.  This suggests that the constitution 
is not only a device for governing the future but also a means for retroactively 
  
9. See infra Part IV. 
10. See infra Part III. 
11. A note on terminology: We treat the right to rebel and the right to resist as synonymous.  No doubt 
one can distinguish the two, but at their heart, both concepts refer to a right to defend oneself or 
one’s community against unjust assertions of authority.  Cf. Tony Honoré, The Right to Rebel, 8 
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 34, 36 (1988) (defining the right to rebel as “the right of an individual 
or group to resort to violence” in order to “secure . . . a change in the government,” to “resist . . . a 
change in the government,” or to secure “the right to independence”). 
12. See infra Part V (introducing and discussing the new data on the right to resist in constitutions 
around the world). 
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legitimizing a putatively illegal act.  Rights to resist are as much about yesterday as 
they are about tomorrow. 
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows.  Part I conceptualizes the 
basic features of the right to resist in political theory.  It shows that the right to 
resist is commonly perceived as a right of last resort, triggered only in the most 
extraordinary circumstances of illegitimate government action.  It moreover argues 
that the right to resist is distinct from other rights because of its second-order 
character.  That is, rather than provide a particular substantive limit on state 
authority, the right to resist serves as an enforcement mechanism to protect other 
constitutional rights. 
Part II traces the history of the right to resist in the political thought of 
different societies, ranging from ancient China to the American founders to 
Hobbes and Locke.  Part III presents two positive theories that potentially explain 
why constitutionmakers might include a right to resist in their constitutions.  The 
first theory is that countries adopt this right as a precommitment that enables 
citizens to coordinate against illegitimate government authority.  In this capacity, 
the right to resist is a fundamentally forward-looking device that imposes con-
straints on future government action.  We expect that countries are particularly 
likely to embrace such a forward-looking precommitment device during demo-
cratic transitions as a potential insurance policy against undemocratic backsliding.  
A second, and potentially more troubling, theory is that coupmakers may adopt 
the right to resist to justify their actions retroactively.  If the current regime came 
to power through unconstitutional means, then enshrining such a right may 
legitimize the coupmaker’s actions ex post.  This produces two competing hypo-
theses: that the right is adopted by democratic regimes particularly after demo-
cratic transitions or that it is adopted in the aftermath of coups d’état. 
Part IV presents our original data on constitutional right-to-resist provi-
sions and uses it to document the historical trajectory of this right in the world’s 
constitutions graphically.  Through textual analysis of all right-to-resist provi-
sions, the Article documents some important internal dimensions of variation 
within this right and proposes a framework for classifying such provisions. 
Part V presents an original empirical analysis identifying the conditions 
under which countries adopt a right to resist.  We find that countries are more 
likely to adopt right-to-resist provisions both during democratic transitions and 
after coups d’état.  This suggests that the right serves to prevent undemocratic 
backsliding of newly democratic regimes as well as to legitimate ex post the action 
of coupmakers.  When further exploring this somewhat puzzling finding, we find 
that it is mainly Latin American countries that adopted the right to resist in the 
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aftermath of a coup d’état, while in other parts of the world the right to resist is more 
likely to function as a precommitment device against undemocratic backsliding. 
This apparently dual function of the right to resist has significant 
implications for our understanding of constitutions more generally.  Consti-
tutions are typically adopted to bind the future on behalf of the present.13  Yet our 
findings show that they, at least in some cases, also have the important purpose of 
interpreting, and in some cases justifying, the past.  Finally, the conclusion explores 
the possible consequences of the right to resist in actual constitutional practice. 
I. THE RIGHT TO RESIST IN POLITICAL THEORY 
The right to resist has a long history in political theory and has been a feature 
of political thought in different societies, ranging from ancient China to the 
American founding.  Where it has appeared, the right to resist has been tied to 
the notion that people can legitimately resist their government in certain situ-
ations.  While the earliest iterations of such rights commonly justified right-to-
resist provisions on some notion of higher law,14 subsequent conceptualizations 
of the right have had a more diverse array of motivations.  In this Part, we unpack 
the concept and structure of the right to resist and highlight some of its essential 
elements.  In the next Part, we provide a thumbnail history of its underpinnings 
in various societies. 
A. Concept and Structure 
Political theorists typically regard the right to resist as a form of voice exer-
cised by the people in extreme circumstances.  It is justified only in cases of con-
siderable legal alienation wherein the law (or its application) differs drastically 
and systematically from the will of the community at large.15  There must be a 
  
13. See STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINT: ON THE THEORY OF LIBERAL 
DEMOCRACY 135 (1995) (discussing how “[a] constitution . . . disempowers short-sighted ma-
jorities in the name of binding norms”); JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME: A THEORY OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 93 (2001) (describing constitutionmaking as “a na-
tion’s struggle to lay down and live out its own fundamental political commitments over time”). 
14. See Edward Rubin, Judicial Review and the Right to Resist, 97 GEO. L.J. 61, 67 (2008) (suggesting 
that right to resist provisions used to be viewed as a higher form of law that “arises from some source 
beyond the government’s boundaries, binding the ruler as well as its subjects” and “operat[ing] as a 
control or a constraint upon the ruler”). 
15. See Roberto Gargarella, The Last Resort: The Right of Resistance in Situations of Legal Alienation, 
SELA (SEMINARIO EN LATINOAMÉRICA DE TEORÍA CONSTITUCIONAL Y POLÍTICA) PAPERS 
1 (2003), http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yls_sela/23 (arguing that in situations in which the 
law does not represent the will of the community, or “legal alienation,” violations of the law are 
comprehensible and even worthy). 
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level of abuse that admits of no alternative path than resistance; the normal chan-
nels of voice must not be available or effective.  The right to resist is not to be 
invoked in response to everyday, garden-variety illegalities.16  Rather, it is only 
when the level of injustice becomes truly intolerable, without conventional legal 
remedy, that resistance can be invoked.17 
The right to resist is also distinguishable from civil disobedience.18  Civil 
disobedience is nonviolent protest designed to affect particular public policies.  In 
contrast, the right to resist evokes the language of violence.  It has as its aims not 
merely the replacement of particular policies with more desirable ones but the 
wholesale restructuring of an entire regime.  It thus requires a higher threshold of 
abuse before being invoked, but it also has more severe consequences for the 
target of protest. 
The right to resist is sometimes an individual right and sometimes a collec-
tive one.  Tony Honoré distinguishes three different situations for exercise of the 
right, all of which involve a permissible resort to violence.19  The right can be 
exercised on behalf of the oppressed to change government, which he calls “rad-
ical rebellion”; it can be used to resist a change in government that the rulers seek 
to bring about, which he calls “conservative rebellion”; or it can be used to secure 
independence, as in the right to self-determination.20  In the case of the former 
two situations, individuals and collectivities may invoke the right if the indi-
viduals have suffered the requisite forms of oppression.  In contrast, the self-
determination category requires that an individual possess membership in a 
defined collectivity prior to exercising the right.21 
Note that effectively exercising the right to resist does not require a fully 
articulated alternative program.  The exercise of the right is a critique of the 
current regime, but it is no defense of the regime to say that resisters have no 
specific plans for a replacement.  This point sheds light on some of the current 
debates surrounding the Occupy Wall Street movement, which has at times 
  
16. See Arthur Kaufmann, Small Scale Right to Resist, 21 NEW ENG. L. REV. 571, 574 (1985–1986) 
(explaining that the right to resist should be considered an emergency right and used only in 
extremely exceptional situations). 
17. See id. (“Resistance may be considered only subsidiary, to wit, when and if all legal and peaceful 
remedies have been exhausted.”). 
18. See Gargarella, supra note 15, at 2–4 (outlining the similarities and differences between civil 
disobedience and what Gargarella calls “constitutional resistance”); see also CONSTITUTION OF 
DEC. 1992 [NIGER], § 6 (providing for a right to resist through civil disobedience). 
19. Honoré, supra note 11, at 36. 
20. Id. at 36–37. 
21. Id. at 37 (“An individual cannot by himself have a right to self-determination, but he may have a 
right to rebel by virtue of his membership of a group (e.g. Palestinians) which has such a right.”). 
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invoked the right to resist in justifying its actions.22  One line of criticism is that 
the movement lacks coherent demands or a positive political program.  But this 
critique is irrelevant in terms of the right to resist per se.  The only predicate for 
justified resistance is abuse by the authorities that rises to a certain high level. 
The right to resist, according to some scholars, can also be differentiated from 
the right to revolution.  In Professor Arthur Kaufmann’s formulation, the right to 
resist does not excuse every behavior and requires a degree of proportionality in its 
exercise.23  Otherwise the right is not merely that of resistance but of revolution.  
The right to resist, as opposed to a right of revolt, has as its goal a restoration of a 
constitutional order, not its complete displacement.  It does not seek to replace 
the normative standard for guiding future behavior of rulers, but seeks simply to 
enforce it.  The right to resist, in its purest form, is about centering the pieces on 
the chessboard of governance, not about fundamentally changing the game itself: 
It calls for a return to normal. 
B. Second-Order Character 
The right to resist has a particular structure that distinguishes it from other 
rights claims.  Conventional theories of rights treat them as justified claims en-
forceable at law.  They are sometimes considered trumps or, in one alternative, 
optimizing conditions.24  Under either view, a right is a justified claim that in-
volves an ability to act in a particular way in the interests of justice. 
The right to rebel or to resist unjust policies has a different structure.  First, 
it assumes that there is an external standard against which to judge the behavior 
of rulers, one that is not incorporated into the right itself.  This may in turn de-
pend on an exogenously defined principle or else on considerations of the “consti-
tutional order” rather than on the authority of the ruling regime itself.25  Rather 
  
22. See, e.g., Endorsement of the Declaration of Occupy Wall St. by Occupy Dayton on April 21, 
2012, OCCUPY DAYTON (June 11, 2012), http://www.occupydaytonoh.org/archives/1893 (“We 
recognize that our nation articulated a dream of political democracy in 1776 and established the 
right to rebel against tyranny.”) (emphasis added). 
23. See Kaufmann, supra note 16. 
24. See ROBERT ALEXY, A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS (Julian Rivers trans., 2002) 
(conceptualizing rights as optimizing conditions); Ronald Dworkin, Rights as Trumps, in 
THEORIES OF RIGHTS 153 (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1984) (conceptualizing rights as trumps over 
the collective goals of a political action or policy). 
25. See, e.g., CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA DE HONDURAS Jan. 11, 1982, art. 3, translated in 
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF HONDURAS 1982, at 1–2 (Gen. Secretariat, Org. of Am. 
States ed., 1982) (“No one owes allegiance to a usurping government nor to those who assume 
office or public service by force of arms or by using means or procedures which violate or ignore the 
provisions established by this Constitution and other laws.  The acts adopted by such authorities 
are null.  The people have the right to resort to insurrection in defense of the constitutional order.”). 
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than imposing a particular substantive limitation upon rulers directly, the right to 
resist is a second-order condition, by which other substantive rights are made 
secure.26  For this reason, the constitutional text cannot really be considered the 
source of the right per se.  Rather it is a declaratory provision, recognizing what 
already exists, which is the constituent authority of the people to serve as ultimate 
judge of illegal behavior on the part of their rulers.  Even if it is not the source of 
the constraint itself, the inclusion of a right to resist in a constitutional text can 
facilitate its exercise, for example by stipulating predicate conditions and desig-
nating who has the right to invoke it.  Properly speaking, however, the textual 
right to resist only restates what already exists.27 
Second, the right assumes that the people are the proper enforcers of the 
constitution.  That is, rather than rely on courts or on Madisonian notions of 
structural constraint, the right to rebel speaks directly to “the people themselves.”28  
This position is consistent with recent work on the enforcement of constitutional 
democracy.  Scholars in recent years have emphasized that it is not the courts that 
primarily interpret or enforce the constitution; instead, they argue, extrajudicial 
mechanisms dependent on popular voice are the ultimate sources of constraint.29 
At the heart of this position lies an implicit optimism.  After all, in-
corporating a right to resist assumes that the people can overcome the staggering 
mobilization and collective action challenges required for such constitutional en-
forcement.30  As with any endeavor necessitating substantial coordination among 
many individuals, each beholden to differing moral and political paradigms (to 
  
26. See Honoré, supra note 11, at 38 (describing the right to resist as a remedy that exists where there is 
a large-scale violation of primary rights). 
27. See Heiner Bielefeldt, The Right to Resist, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF VIOLENCE 
RESEARCH 1097, 1103 (Wilhelm Heitmeyer & John Hagan eds., 2003) (stating that efforts to 
include the right to resist in positive law are not concerned with constitutionalizing the right but 
rather “with the formal strengthening of the right to resist, whose existence is already postulated, 
and defining more precisely the conditions under which it can be exercised”). 
28. LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 248 (2004) (arguing that the people themselves, not the courts, are “the highest 
authority in the land on constitutional law” and that the Supreme Court “is ultimately supposed to 
yield to our judgments about what the Constitution means”). 
29. See, e.g., id. at 237–39 (calling into question the assumption that the U.S. Congress cannot be trusted 
to resolve constitutional issues in place of the Court); JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND 
DISAGREEMENT 305 (1999) (arguing against judicial review and presenting a legislative “model of 
opinionated disagreement” as a replacement, in which “men and women of high spirit argue 
passionately and vociferously about what rights we have, what justice requires, and what the 
common good amounts to, motivated in their disagreement not by what’s in it for them but by a 
desire to get it right”). 
30. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE 
THEORY OF GROUPS 2 (1971) (explaining that unless there is “coercion or some other special 
device” to help people take action as a group, “rational, self-interested individuals will not act to 
achieve their common or group interests”). 
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say nothing of personal incentives), the exercise of the right to resist would be 
difficult under the best of circumstances.  An inability to agree on the predicate 
conditions for triggering the right to resist would likely exacerbate these collective 
action problems to the point that the right itself would become irrelevant in 
practice.  Even once these triggers are agreed on, the people must also be able to 
coordinate the timing of resistance—a point that we return to below.31 
A third distinct feature of the right to resist is that it involves actions that, 
under normal circumstances, are viewed as illegal or reprehensible.32  In this sense, 
it is a kind of right to do wrong.33  It has this in common with the law of just 
war, in which acts normally considered criminal are justified by reference to the 
larger aim they serve.34  Like just war, it gives rise to the question of whether there 
is a corresponding duty on the part of the target of justified violence to refrain 
from responding.  Presumably, if the right to resist is properly exercised, the state 
has a duty not to repress those engaged in it.  Such repression might conceivably 
lead to criminal liability, either on the international plane or in local courts after a 
political transition, on the part of state agents that engage in such repression. 
II. THE RIGHT TO RESIST IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
As discussed in the previous Part, the core premises of the right to resist in 
political theory include the idea that there exists an external standard against 
which to judge the behavior of rulers, and the notion that the people themselves 
are the proper instrument for enforcing this standard.  In this Part, we examine the 
evolution of the right to resist in various traditions of political and religious 
thought, from ancient China to the American founders. 
  
31. See infra Part III. 
32. Honoré, supra note 11, at 36 (noting that the right to resist “is a right to commit acts which are 
almost certainly unlawful and probably criminal by the standards of the state against which the 
rebellion is directed” and may consist of acts such as “shooting people or planting bombs”). 
33. See JEREMY WALDRON, A Right to Do Wrong, in LIBERAL RIGHTS: COLLECTED PAPERS 
1981–1991, at 63, 63 (1993) (“[I]f we take the idea of moral rights seriously, we have to countenance 
the possibility that an individual may have a moral right to do something that is, from the moral 
point of view, wrong.”). 
34. See WILLIAM V. O’BRIEN, THE CONDUCT OF JUST AND LIMITED WAR 14 (1981) (discussing 
permissible war as an “exceptional” action requiring objective justification). 
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A. The Chinese Tradition 
The Confucian political-legal tradition is a diverse one, whose classical 
sources are traced to the five centuries before the rise of the Common Era.35  The 
Confucian tradition featured a natural law concept of normative ethical standards 
which apply to all—the li.36  Li originally referred to specific rituals but came to 
refer more broadly to behaviors that each person should observe according to his 
or her role.37  Because of its emphasis on the distinct duties associated with parti-
cular roles, the standards for rulers were qualitatively different from those for 
ordinary men.  But standards they certainly were, against which external behavior 
could be measured.38  Indeed, this is one reason that the Confucian tradition 
glorified abdication in favor of a wise successor rather than hereditary rule.39 
Within Confucian thought, the idea of a right to resist that inhered in the 
people is typically associated with Mencius.40  Mencius was a Chinese phi-
losopher who glorified the sage-king ideal and championed the notion of the 
Mandate of Heaven.41  Rulers would enjoy the Mandate of Heaven so long as 
  
35. See generally RONNIE L. LITTLEJOHN, CONFUCIANISM: AN INTRODUCTION, at xix (2011) 
(describing Confucianism as “the great Chinese tradition that has gathered around the teachings of 
Confucius (Kongzi) for over 2,500 years” and as an “ancient and immense tradition of great 
subtlety and complexity”). 
36. See id. at 27 (describing how Confucius taught that the li are rites that “include the behaviors that 
indicate moral appropriateness and cultured decorum in relationships and ceremonies”); KWONG-
LOI SHUN, MENCIUS AND EARLY CHINESE THOUGHT 24 (1997) (stating that li originally 
referred to “rites of sacrifice” and later grew to encapsulate “not just ceremonial behavior but 
behavior appropriate to one’s social position,” but was still frequently used to refer to “rules of 
conduct governing ceremonial behavior”). 
37. See Chaihark Hahm, Ritual and Constitutionalism: Disputing the Ruler’s Legitimacy in a Confucian 
Polity, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 135, 144 (2009) (“[T]he idea of li came to lose much of its religious 
overtones. . . . [I]t began to refer to the proper way of performing a certain task.  The task at hand 
might be such formal ceremonies as weddings, funerals, or coronations, but it could also include 
relatively more informal matters like writing a letter or even addressing a person in everyday 
conversation.” (footnote omitted)). 
38. See Tom Ginsburg, Confucian Constitutionalism? The Emergence of Constitutional Review in Korea 
and Taiwan, 27 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 763, 766–67 (2002) (observing that under Confucian 
tradition Chinese emperors had a duty to rule in an ethical and moral fashion and to see to the 
welfare of the people); Hahm, supra note 37, at 150 (noting that Confucian rituals, or li, “could be 
used to legitimize the power of the ruler as well as to censure and discipline the ruler”). 
39. See Sungmoon Kim, Confucian Constitutionalism: Mencius and Xunzi on Virtue, Ritual, and Royal 
Transmission, 73 REV. POL. 371, 377 (2011) (noting that abdication was preferable to hereditary 
rule of inferior kings). 
40. DENNIS BLOODWORTH, THE CHINESE LOOKING GLASS 30 (1967) (stating that Mencius 
established the “principle of popular revolt” when he remarked on the murder of the last king of the 
Shang dynasty: “I have heard that a fellow called Jou was put to death, but not that a sovereign was 
killed” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
41. See id. (describing Mencius’s conception of the Mandate of Heaven); FUNG YU-LAN, A HISTORY 
OF CHINESE PHILOSOPHY: THE PERIOD OF THE PHILOSOPHERS (FROM THE BEGINNINGS 
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they behaved properly.  If they failed to observe the li, however, they might lose 
the Mandate of Heaven, and this would be reflected in the rise of natural 
disasters, wars, or economic difficulties.42 
The theory of the Mandate of Heaven helped scholars to understand the rise 
and fall of rulers, and it is sometimes identified with a right of rebellion.  But 
properly speaking, Mencius identified heaven, not the people, as the source of 
constraint.  The people’s behavior reflected the will of heaven but did not consti-
tute an independently exercised agency.43  This has led to some recent revision of 
the view that Mencius was truly supportive of laypeople’s right to rebel.44  It is 
likely that he distinguished a right of protest from a true right of rebellion, which 
implies an ability to replace the ruler with a new one.  The current view is that 
exclusively noble families held this latter right.45  Still, there is consensus that there 
was some concept of justified resistance to commands of the rulers, and later 
scholars discussed this.46 
Ultimately, the Mencian tradition within Confucian thought was sublimated 
for a number of reasons.47  The ruling class may have feared the possibilities 
associated with implied agency on the part of the people.  Rulers certainly 
preferred the notion of hereditary rule to the idea that only sage-kings could 
  
TO CIRCA 100 B.C.) 117 (Derk Bodde trans., 1937) (“In Mencius’s ideal government, . . . the ruler 
of the empire must be a Sage.”).  Mencius was not the originator of the idea of the Mandate of 
Heaven, but he was a staunch supporter of the concept.  See LITTLEJOHN, supra note 35, at 3 
(attributing the origin of the Mandate to the Duke of Zhou). 
42. See BLOODWORTH, supra note 40, at 30 (“[T]he ruler holds a celestial license as long as he rules well, 
but if he does ill, and another overthrows him and takes his place, it is because a frowning heaven 
has withdrawn its mandate and conferred it on the newcomer, who is, ipso facto, the better man.”). 
43. See Kim, supra note 39, at 380. 
44. See Justin Tiwald, A Right of Rebellion in the Mengzi?, 7 DAO 269, 270 (2008) (noting that 
Mencius suggested “that derelict rulers [could] be justly deposed,” but “[took] pains to avoid 
endorsing [a popular right of rebellion], and even designate[d] a particular member of the ruling 
class—‘Heaven’s Delegated Official’ . . . —to make crucial decisions about the overthrow of 
governments on the people’s behalf”); see also Kim, supra note 39, at 378, 385, 387 (arguing that 
Xunzi is the better source for the Chinese doctrine of the right to rebel and that Mencius was 
focusing on a small set of elites rather than the masses). 
45. See Kim, supra note 39, at 385 (arguing that feudal lords or minsters of the noble families with 
moral virtue possessed the political right to replace the ruler); Tiwald, supra note 44, at 270 (noting 
that Mengzi designated a member of the ruling class—called “Heaven’s Delegated Official”—to 
decide whether to overthrow the ruler on behalf of the people). 
46. See Tiwald, supra note 44, at 269 (mentioning scholars that believed Mencius advocated for 
resistance to unjust rulers, albeit disagreeing with their assumption that the common people could 
do the resisting). 
47. See H.G. CREEL, CHINESE THOUGHT FROM CONFUCIUS TO MAO TSÊ-TUNG 166–72 (1953) 
(discussing Emperor Wu’s legalist traits and pointing out that while Wu adopted Confucianism as 
the state ideology, in many respects his practices were Confucian in name only); XINZHONG YAO, 
AN INTRODUCTION TO CONFUCIANISM 52 (2000) (describing how Confucianism modified its 
documents to gain broader acceptance during the advent of the Han dynasty). 
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legitimately rule.  Ultimately, the meritocratic system, in which scholar-officials 
formed the backbone of the regime and its principle constraint, emerged be-
ginning with the Han dynasty in 206 BCE.48  Still, in times of trouble and dynastic 
change, the Mencian tradition could experience revival.  The Song dynasty, for 
example, argued that it had received the Mandate of Heaven and produced an 
official history of the preceding period that traced the Mandate.49  The Chinese 
tradition thus included the seeds of a right to resist, though the idea did not fully 
blossom as it did in the era of the French and American revolutions. 
B. Jewish and Islamic Religious Thought 
An external standard against which the behavior of government authorities 
may be evaluated is a feature of any axial legal system in which there is a realm of 
God and a realm of man.50  By definition, the authority of God is superior to that 
of Caesar, and as such it is common for religiously based legal systems to artic-
ulate expressed limits on political authority.51  Religious systems, while perhaps 
limiting an earthly ruler’s authority, may well stop short of legitimizing the people 
as a relevant actor for enforcing these boundaries.  After all, if a divinity wants to 
punish an unjust ruler, she would certainly possess the ability to do so, rendering 
popular enforcement redundant.  Ancient Israelite traditions of remonstrance, for 
example, never developed into a full-fledged right to resist because they did not 
address the crucial question of what earthly body could determine when unjust 
rule reached the level justifying a rebellion.52  Likewise, the stoic philosophers 
  
48. See VITALY A. RUBIN, INDIVIDUAL AND STATE IN ANCIENT CHINA: ESSAYS ON FOUR 
CHINESE PHILOSOPHERS 29–30 (Steven I. Levine trans., 1976) (describing the adoption of 
Confucianism by the Han dynasty and the establishment of a system of examinations for the 
recruitment of government officials); Kim, supra note 39, at 372 (noting that a blend of Confucianism 
and legalism became “firmly institutionalized” and “massively politicized” during the Han dynasty). 
49. See F.W. MOTE, IMPERIAL CHINA: 900–1800, at 102 (1999) (“The Song dynasty’s founder, 
Zhao Kuangyin, went to great lengths to be ‘correct’ (zheng), as the criteria for legitimacy defined 
correctness, by arranging for the Zhou empress dowager, in the name of her young son, to abdicate 
in his favor. . . . He thus could lay claim to be ‘correct,’ half of what was required to legitimate the 
transfer of Heaven’s Mandate.”). 
50. See S.N. Eisenstadt, Introduction: The Axial Age Breakthroughs—Their Characteristics and Origins, in 
THE ORIGINS AND DIVERSITY OF AXIAL AGE CIVILIZATIONS 1, 8 (S.N. Eisenstadt ed., 1986) 
(noting that in all axial age civilizations “there emerged the conception of the accountability of the 
rulers and of the community to a higher authority, God, Divine Law, and the like”). 
51. See Luke 20:24–25 (New American Standard Bible) (‘“Show Me a denarius.  Whose head and 
inscription does it have?’  They said, ‘Caesar’s.’  And He said to them, ‘Then render to Caesar the 
things that are Caesar’s, and to God the things that are God’s.’”). 
52. See, e.g., Rubin, supra note 14, at 69–70 (recounting the story of King David’s murder of Uriah the 
Hittite, where the application of laws to the king was instructed by a prophet whose authority and 
knowledge came from God). 
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thought that tyrannical comeuppance was best brought about through divine, 
rather than popular, mechanisms.53 
In this light, it is not surprising that the right to resist does not feature 
strongly in the Islamic legal tradition.54  At the same time, there are some Qur’an 
verses that do seem to point to limits on the duty to obey temporal rulers.  Re-
nowned historian Bernard Lewis identifies two such verses in particular that 
support the idea of disobeying a ruler that compels a person to do something 
contrary to divine law.55 
C. Western Political Thought 
1. Medieval Antecedents 
Medieval European political thought saw the gradual evolution of ideas of 
justified resistance against unjust authority.  Some of the thinking was con-
tractual, such as the thirteenth-century British Magna Carta or the sixteenth-
century Polish Henrician Articles,56 both of which authorized nobles to seize the 
king’s castles if he should fail to observe the terms of their respective written 
agreements.57  Similarly, some early sources, such as the German Sachsenspiegel, 
treated resistance against unjust authority as a duty, requiring the populace to 
resist rather than merely empowering them to do so.58 
  
53. See F.F. BRUCE, THE NEW TESTAMENT DOCUMENTS: ARE THEY RELIABLE? 113–20 (5th 
ed. 1960) (quoting a seventh-century letter from stoic philosopher Mara bar-Serapion in stating, 
“What advantage did the Athenians gain from putting Socrates to death?  Famine and plague came 
upon them as a judgment for their crime.  What advantage did the Jews gain from executing their 
wise king?  It was just after that their kingdom was abolished.  God justly avenged these three wise 
men: the Athenians died of hunger; the Samians were overwhelmed by the sea; the Jews, ruined 
and driven from their land, live in complete dispersion”). 
54. Cf. Bernard Lewis, Freedom and Justice in the Modern Middle East, FOREIGN AFF., May/June 2005, 
at 36, 39–40 (discussing the “quietist” approach to resistance against authority in Islamic tradition). 
55. See id. (noting that the verses “there is no obedience in sin” and “do not obey a creature against his 
creator” create a duty of disobedience). 
56. See JACEK JEDRUCH, CONSTITUTIONS, ELECTIONS AND LEGISLATURES OF POLAND, 1493–
1977: A GUIDE TO THEIR HISTORY 88–91 (1982) (discussing the “rokosz” or the notion that the 
nobility could refuse royal decrees or act against royal authorities should the monarch violate their 
legitimate rights and privileges). 
57. See Honoré, supra note 11, at 42.  But cf. id. (noting that later editions of the Magna Carta omitted 
this clause). 
58. See Bielefeldt, supra note 27, at 1098 (“And a man must even resist his king and judge if he does 
wrong, and even help to fight him by any means, even if he is his kinsman or liege lord.  And in so 
doing he does not breach his duty of loyalty.” (quoting the Sachsenspiegel, a legal codebook from the 
German Middle Ages) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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Christian scholars in the Middle Ages likewise argued at times for the 
existence of a right to resist unjust authority.59  While the New Testament itself is 
in some places quite clear about the importance of obeying government au-
thorities,60 Thomas Aquinas, for example, held that the overthrow of a tyrannical 
government was not sedition.61  William of Ockham’s grounding of papal au-
thority within the General Council of the Roman Catholic Church similarly 
justified the disciplining of a pope by the broader community.62 
Subsequent thinkers such as Francisco Suárez grounded the sovereignty of 
kings in earthly authority rather than in a divine right.63  Monarchies, in this 
view, were produced by people to resolve particular problems.  It would thus be 
acceptable to resist application of an unjust law.64  Still, these Christian thinkers 
did not develop a full-fledged right to resist.  Calvinists, themselves severely 
oppressed by nominally infallible kings, developed their own ideas about unjust 
authority.65  Their practical solutions were limited, but Calvin seems to have at 
least contemplated a magistrate’s duty to resist tyranny and a duty of the faithful 
to resist infringements on the exercise of religion.66  These ideas helped lay the 
basis for social contract theory and incorporated a proto-notion of resistance, 
  
59. See id. (observing that the question of the legitimacy of resistance and tyrannicide “was the subject 
of many treatises in the scholastic philosophy of the High and Late Middle Ages”). 
60. See, e.g., Romans 13:1–2 (New International Version) (“Everyone must submit himself to the 
governing authorities, for there is no authority except that which God has established.  The author-
ities that exist have been established by God.  Consequently, he who rebels against the authority is 
rebelling against what God has instituted, and those who do so will bring judgment on themselves.”). 
61. See Bielefeldt, supra note 27, at 1098 (stating Aquinas’s position that resistance against a tyrant was 
not sinful rebellion but “a struggle against unjust dominion—dominion that itself amounted to a 
rebellion against the law”). 
62. See Rubin, supra note 14, at 76. 
63. See David B. Kopel et al., The Human Right of Self-Defense, 22 BYU J. PUB. L. 43, 71–72 (2007) 
(noting Suárez’s belief that “a prince had just power only if the power were bestowed by the 
people”); Rubin, supra note 14, at 78 (discussing Suárez’s argument that political authority was a 
human creation, not ordained by God, and thus subordinate to the Church and subject to natural 
law). 
64. 2 FRANCISCO SUÁREZ, A Treatise on Laws and God the Lawgiver, in SELECTIONS FROM THREE 
WORKS OF FRANCISCO SUÁREZ, S.J. 3, 273 (Gwladys L. Williams et al. trans., 1995) (“Neither 
could the aforesaid remedy of the defect [of jurisdiction] with respect to a subject, reasonably have 
been applied to those things through which it would have been possible to do away with the right 
of self defence—springing from the law of nature—again a criminal charge, especially a charge that 
was so grave; for it would not be permissible that the Emperor should abolish those things which 
proceed from the natural law.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
65. See DAVID T. BALL, THE HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW, 1536–1803: THE 
DUTY TO RESIST TYRANNY 7 (2005); Rubin, supra note 14, at 80 (“Calvinist writers argued that 
ungodly kings, representing the erroneous choice of an ungodly people, must be resisted.”). 
66. BALL, supra note 65, at 43–54 (describing magistrates’ duties and those of the faithful). 
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even if not fully conceptualized as a duty or accompanied by an institutional 
manifestation. 
The right to resist became increasingly central to political debate in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.  The thinkers in this era tended to treat the 
collective right to resist as grounded in an innate right of human self-defense.  
For example, while the conventional view is that the great Dutch jurist Hugo 
Grotius was not much of a supporter of popular resistance,67 some scholars be-
lieve that he would have supported a qualified right to resist if certain conditions 
were met.68  Samuel von Pufendorf generally treated the supreme authority of a 
sovereign as superior to all laws but also held that “a People may defend themselves 
against the extreme and unjust Violence of their Prince.”69  Similarly, Emer de 
Vattel believed that an oppressive Prince provides “his subjects a legal right to 
resist him . . . in their own defence.”70 
2. Locke and Hobbes 
The right to resist is a central subject of debate between the Lockean and 
Hobbesian conceptualizations of social contract theory.  For Hobbes, the social 
contract is complete and replaces prior sources of authority; therefore “there can 
happen no breach of Covenant on the part of the Soveraigne; and consequently 
none of his Subjects, by any pretence of forfeiture, can be freed from his 
Subjection.”71  That is, once a sovereign is granted authority, he may not be 
subject to claims of legal violation.  Hobbes’s notion was rooted in a view that 
there was no legitimate judge outside the sovereign: 
  
67. See JOHN NEVILLE FIGGIS, STUDIES OF POLITICAL THOUGHT FROM GERSON TO 
GROTIUS, 1414–1625, at 211 (1907) (“Not only is territorial sovereignty a necessary assumption of 
International Law, but Grotius goes out of his way to condemn the theory of resistance, to show 
that by the lex regia popular power is wholly transferred to the prince.”). 
68. See Peter Borschberg, Grotius, the Social Contract and Political Resistance: A Study of the Unpublished 
Theses LVI 64 n.188 (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law History & Theory of Int’l Law Series, Working 
Paper No. 2006/7, 2007), available at http://iilj.org/publications/2006-7borschberg.asp (interpreting 
Grotius’s contention that “he who abuses sovereign power renders himself unworthy of sovereignty, 
and ceases to be a prince, in consequence of the very act by which he converts himself into a tyrant”). 
69. SAMUEL PUFENDORF, OF THE LAW OF NATURE AND NATIONS bk. VII, ch. VIII, at 722 
(Basil Kennett trans., 4th ed. 1729) (1672). 
70. EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, OR, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE, 
APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS, WITH THREE 
EARLY ESSAYS ON THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF NATURAL LAW AND ON LUXURY bk. II 
290 (Béla Kapossy & Richard Whatmore eds., Thomas Nugent trans., Liberty Fund 2008) (1758). 
71. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 97 (Richard E. Flathman & David Johnston eds., W.W. 
Norton & Co. 1997) (1651). 
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[I]f any one, or more of them, pretend a breach of the Covenant made 
by the Soveraigne at his Institution; and others, or one other of his 
Subjects, or himselfe alone, pretend there was no such breach, there is 
in this case, no Judge to decide the controversie: it returns therefore to 
the Sword again; and every man recovereth the right of Protecting 
himselfe by his own strength, contrary to the designe they had in the 
Institution.72 
There is in this view no right to resist, only a right to disband the social contract 
and return to the state of nature—a result to be avoided whenever possible.73 
For Locke, on the other hand, all individuals had natural rights, which they 
surrendered voluntarily as part of the social contract.74  The purpose of society 
was not merely to avoid the destructive battle of all against all but to protect one’s 
property and other rights inherently valued by human beings.  Indeed, for Locke 
the primary enforcement mechanism of the social contract was the peoples’ 
collective right to legitimately revolt against the government should it violate the 
terms of the contract.  As he put it, “whenever the Legislators endeavour to take 
away, and destroy the Property of the People, or to reduce them to Slavery under 
Arbitrary Power, they put themselves in a state of War with the People, who are 
thereupon absolved from any farther Obedience.”75  Indeed, in some cases, Locke 
thought of revolution not as a right but as a duty to prevent tyranny.  While 
neither Locke nor Hobbes anticipated a legalized or judicialized concept of con-
stitutional enforcement, Locke’s specification of popular action as an enforcement 
mechanism for the social contract helped crystallize the intellectual underpin-
nings of the modern right to resist.76 
Once the basis for legitimate government is conceived of in contractual 
terms, the requirement of an external standard for evaluating government author-
ity is met.  Blackstone, too, included a right to resist in his listing of natural laws.77  
  
72. Id. 
73. Id. at 70 (“In such condition . . . the life of man [is] solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.”). 
74. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 330–31 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge 
Univ. Press 1988) (1690) (“The only way whereby any one devests himself of his Natural Liberty, 
and puts on the bonds of Civil Society is by agreeing with other Men to joyn and unite into a 
Community . . . .”). 
75. Id. at 412. 
76. Locke was writing, of course, in the immediate aftermath of the Glorious Revolution, and some see 
his work as a contemporaneous justification of it.  See JEREMY WALDRON, GOD, LOCKE, AND 
EQUALITY: CHRISTIAN FOUNDATIONS OF JOHN LOCKE’S POLITICAL THOUGHT 84 (2002); 
Lois G. Schwoerer, Locke, Lockean Ideas, and the Glorious Revolution, 51 J. HIST. IDEAS 531 (1990) 
(noting Locke’s role in the Glorious Revolution). 
77. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *139 (“The fifth and last auxiliary right of the 
subject, that I shall at present mention, is that of having arms for their defence, suitable to their 
condition and degree, and such as are allowed by law.  Which is also declared by the same statute . . . 
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All that was needed to instantiate the right was a group of people who were 
willing to declare its exercise appropriate with regard to a particular tyrant.  George 
III turned out to be the unlucky ruler. 
3. American Founders 
The American founders were enthusiastic proponents of a right to rebel 
against unjust tyranny.  Informed by Locke, they rooted the right to rebel in 
natural law and saw their own plights as meeting the necessary preconditions to 
justify revolt.78  This is apparent in both the Virginia Bill of Rights and the 
Declaration of Independence.79  In the Declaration, Jefferson notes that the people 
had first exercised their right of petition, which may be thought of as a predicate 
for rebellion.  It is only through repeated rejection of petitions that King George 
becomes “[a] Prince, whose character is thus marked by every act which may 
define a Tyrant, [who] is unfit to be the ruler of a free people.”80  Jefferson 
deemed rebellion against such absolute despotism as not only a right but also a 
duty, as had Locke and the Sachsenspiegel before him.81 
  
and is indeed a public allowance, under due restrictions, of the natural right of resistance and self-
preservation, when the sanctions of society and laws are found insufficient to restrain the violence 
of oppression.”). 
78. See, e.g., CHRISTIAN G. FRITZ, AMERICAN SOVEREIGNS: THE PEOPLE AND AMERICA’S 
CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 13 (2008) (noting that, following 
Locke’s suggestion that “the right of revolution arose only under the most dire circumstances,” the 
American founders saw revolution as “the last-ditch effort of an oppressed people” and “an ex-
pression of ‘the law of nature’”); Samuel West, On the Right to Rebel Against Governors (Election Day 
Sermon), in 1 AMERICAN POLITICAL WRITING DURING THE FOUNDING ERA, 1760–1805, at 
410, 419–20 (1983) (“[B]y the law of self-preservation, which is the first law of nature, they have 
not only an undoubted right, but it is their indispensable duty, if they cannot be redressed any other 
way, to renounce all submission to the government that has oppressed them, and set up an 
independent state of their own . . . .”). 
79. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“That whenever any Form of 
Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, 
and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers 
in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.”); VIRGINIA 
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. III (1776), reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 3, 3 
(Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) (“[W]henever any government shall be found 
inadequate or contrary to these purposes, a majority of the community hath an indubitable, 
unalienable, and indefeasible right, to reform, alter, or abolish it, in such manner as shall be judged 
most conducive to the publick weal.”). 
80. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 31 (U.S. 1776). 
81. Id. para. 2 (“[W]hen a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object 
evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw 
off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future security.”). 
1204 60 UCLA L. REV. 1184 (2013) 
 
 
In addition to grounding the right in natural law, the North American 
colonists grounded their actions in English constitutional law.82  They noted that 
Blackstone characterized the laws of England as including a law of redress against 
public oppression.83  Consistent with the structure outlined above, the colonists 
did not specify, nor feel that they needed to identify, an alternative ruler. 
In treating resistance as a human right, Americans of the founding era were 
informed by state constitutionmakers who themselves favored a rhetoric of resis-
tance and popular sovereignty.84  To this day, many U.S. state constitutions grant 
a right to their citizens to abolish the government.85  For example, the con-
stitutions of New Hampshire, North Carolina, and Tennessee have the identical 
phrase “[t]he doctrine of nonresistance against arbitrary power, and oppression, is 
absurd, slavish, and destructive of the good and happiness of mankind.”86  This 
phrase seems to have originated with New Hampshire’s revolutionary-era 
  
82. See FRITZ, supra note 78, at 13 (noting that the right of revolution “reflected a well-known 
justification for revolution under both natural law and English constitutional doctrine”). 
83. Id. (explaining that at the time of the revolution, English law recognized what William Blackstone 
called “the law of redress against public oppression” (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, supra 
note 77, at *238) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
84. Id. at 24–25 (describing the treatment of the right of revolution in initial state constitutions). 
85. See, e.g., KY. CONST. § 4 (“All power is inherent in the people, and all free governments are 
founded on their authority and instituted for their peace, safety, happiness and the protection of 
property.  For the advancement of these ends, they have at all times an inalienable and indefeasible 
right to alter, reform or abolish their government in such manner as they may deem proper.”); PA. 
CONST. art I, § 2 (“All power is inherent in the people, and all free governments are founded on 
their authority and instituted for their peace, safety and happiness.  For the advancement of these 
ends they have at all times an inalienable and indefeasible right to alter, reform or abolish their 
government in such manner as they may think proper.”); TEX. CONST. art. I, § 2 (“All political 
power is inherent in the people, and all free governments are founded on their authority, and 
instituted for their benefit.  The faith of the people of Texas stands pledged to the preservation of a 
republican form of government, and, subject to this limitation only, they have at all times the 
inalienable right to alter, reform or abolish their government in such manner as they may think 
expedient.”). 
86. N.H. CONST. art. X (“Government being instituted for the common benefit, protection, and 
security, of the whole community, and not for the private interest or emolument of any one man, 
family, or class of men; therefore, whenever the ends of government are perverted, and public 
liberty manifestly endangered, and all other means of redress are ineffectual, the people may, and of 
right ought to reform the old, or establish a new government.  The doctrine of nonresistance 
against arbitrary power, and oppression, is absurd, slavish, and destructive of the good and 
happiness of mankind.”); Declaration of Rights and Other Amendments, North Carolina 
Ratifying Convention art. III (Aug. 1, 1788), reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, 
supra note 79, at 17 (“That government ought to be instituted for the common benefit, protection 
and security of the people; and that the doctrine of non-resistance against arbitrary power and 
oppression is absurd, slavish, and destructive to the good and happiness of mankind.”); TENN. 
CONST. art. I, § 2 (“That government being instituted for the common benefit, the doctrine of 
non-resistance against arbitrary power and oppression is absurd, slavish, and destructive of the good 
and happiness of mankind.”). 
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constitution.87  This in turn had been influenced by the Maryland Bill of Rights 
of 1776, which provided that the people could “reform the old or establish a new 
government” whenever public liberty was manifestly endangered and there was 
no other means of redress.88  A slew of other state constitutions allowed the citi-
zens to “alter, reform or abolish” their governments without such strict precon-
ditions.89  This is relevant to an enduring debate over whether a revolutionary 
government established by the people is itself subject to further revolt, should the 
new government fail to uphold its end of the bargain.90 
The notion of justified resistance also informs the first clause of the Second 
Amendment.  The “well regulated militia” is characterized as necessary to the 
security of a free state, and there is little doubt that the explicit connection be-
tween violence and freedom turns on the notion of justified resistance.91 
The United States struggled in the early years of the Republic with the issue 
of when resistance against authority would be justified.  The Whiskey Rebellion, 
which broke out in western Pennsylvania in 1791 over the question of grain taxes, 
brought the issue to the fore.92  The rebels drew on the right to resist unjust 
authority in justifying their actions.  While the Federalists assumed that the 
Constitution established a sovereign government that was to be obeyed, the 
rebels invoked the collective sovereignty of the people to justify their extracon-
stitutional resistance to the tax.93 
Of course, the real innovation of American constitutionalism is the creation 
of judicial review, which some have argued serves to domesticate the right to 
resist.94  For example, Larry Kramer recently argued that judicial review itself 
derives from the people’s unquestioned ability to resist governmental acts and 
  
87. See N.H. CONST. art X. 
88. MD. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights art. IV, reprinted in 4 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS 
OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 372, 372 (William F. Swindler ed., 1975).  See generally 
FRITZ, supra note 78, at 24 (discussing New Hampshire borrowing Maryland’s language). 
89. See FRITZ, supra note 78, at 24 (discussing Pennsylvania). 
90. See id. at 24–25 (reviewing provisions giving Americans the right to “alter or abolish” their 
constitutions); id. at 268 (noting arguments that the right of revolution was “annihilated” by the 
federal Constitution). 
91. Steven J. Heyman, Natural Rights and the Second Amendment, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 237, 247–49 
(2000) (discussing Lockean influence on the Second Amendment). 
92. See FRITZ, supra note 78, at 166. 
93. See id. at 173–74 (noting that the proponents of the Whiskey Rebellion protests believed that the 
people had the “right to monitor their governments” and that, as the sovereign, the people “had 
the right to alter or abolish their governments”). 
94. See Rubin, supra note 14, at 87 (tying judicial review to resistance); see also FRITZ, supra note 78, at 
23 (quoting Alexander Hamilton for the proposition that judicial review protects popular 
sovereignty). 
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laws that are ultra vires.95  Certainly after the decision of Marbury v. Madison,96 
the people needed not tolerate extralegal actions by their rulers, but now had an 
institutional solution that fell short of exercising resistance.  In some sense, then, 
judicial review can be seen as the end of several hundred years of evolution in the 
idea of justified resistance against ultra vires authority.97 
4. Other Revolutionary Thought 
Unsurprisingly, those who engage in actual revolutions tend to be quite 
comfortable with the right to resist.  The French revolutionaries placed the right 
to resist as one of the central pillars in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and 
of the Citizen, noting that resistance to oppression was a natural right, along with 
those of liberty, property, and security.98  Later revolutionaries in the Marxist 
tradition continued to argue for a right of full-fledged revolution, not simply a 
right to defend an established constitutional order or to restore the status quo 
ante when faced with an oppressive dictator.  As Mao Zedong put it, “[i]t is right 
to rebel against reactionaries.”99 
The right to resist has also been justified in international law, in particular 
by those seeking self-determination.100  A notable document in this regard was the 
1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations 
and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations, issued by the UN General Assembly.101  This document famously con-
demned the “subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploita-
tion” as a violation of the fundamental principle of self-determination.  The Declaration 
provides that “[i]n their actions against, and resistance to, such forcible action in 
pursuit of the exercise of their right to self-determination, such peoples are enti-
tled to seek and to receive support in accordance with the purposes and principles 
  
95. KRAMER, supra note 28, at 92. 
96. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (establishing the doctrine of judicial review). 
97. See Rubin, supra note 14, at 88. 
98. DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND OF THE CITIZEN OF 26 AUGUST 1789 art. 2 
(Fr.), translated in 2 NIJHOFF, supra note 8, at 20. 
99. Stuart R. Schram, The Party in Chinese Communist Ideology, in PARTY LEADERSHIP AND 
REVOLUTIONARY POWER IN CHINA 170, 196 (John Wilson Lewis ed., 1970) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
100. Honoré, supra note 11, at 36–37 (explaining that “given certain conditions, there is indeed a right to 
rebel, a right which has some claim to a recognized place in international law” and that the right 
can be exercised by groups seeking “independence from the society to which it at present belongs” 
or, in other words, “self-determination”). 
101. G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8082 (Oct. 24, 1970). 
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of the Charter.”102  Several national liberation struggles have justified violence, 
including terrorism, in the name of the right to resist.103 
D. Conclusion 
In short, a right to resist has existed in many different political traditions 
across time and space.  What all these traditions have in common is the idea that 
the right provides for evaluation of government performance against some sort 
of external standard and therefore is an ultimate constraint on its behavior.  When 
a government exercises power in the shadow of legitimate potential resistance by the 
people, it will presumably behave more moderately than if it is not so constrained. 
Of course the institutional problems of defining and identifying the condi-
tions for legitimate exercise of the right to resist remain significant.  The coordina-
tion issues for a large public are severe, and in the absence of successful collective 
action by the people, government may remain able to oppress people.  Many 
institutions of modern government may have in some sense arisen to substitute 
for the right of a mass public to resist authority.  As described above, Edward 
Rubin has so argued about judicial review.104  The existence of the international 
human rights regime has also been rooted in the need to protect the people and 
has in theory if not practice substituted for the exercise of the right to resist.105  
Our specific concern is the right to resist in constitutions, to which we now turn. 
III. POSITIVE THEORY: WHY DO STATES ADOPT A RIGHT TO RESIST? 
When might constitutional designers provide a right to resist in a consti-
tution?  To some extent, it is puzzling that they would ever do so, as they might 
  
102. Id. at 124. 
103. See INT’L COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY, TALKING ABOUT TERRORISM: RISKS AND 
CHOICES FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANISATIONS 25–27 (2008), www.ichrp.org/files/ 
reports/35/129_report_en.pdf (noting that some have argued “that the right of resistance is 
justified in asymmetrical conflicts, where one side (usually the state) has overwhelming military 
superiority.  Without access to comparable weapons, . . . armed groups are not in a position to take 
on ‘military targets’ and are obliged to attack softer targets, including civilians”). 
104. See Rubin, supra note 14, at 87 (noting that in the United States judicial review serves as an 
alternative to revolution or resistance). 
105. See Walter Kälin & Jörg Künzli, Article 1F(b): Freedom Fighters, Terrorists, and the Notion of Serious 
Non-Political Crimes, 12 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 46, 51 (2000) (“[W]ithin the context of 
international protection afforded by human rights, entitlement to resist is superseded by an en-
titlement to resort to constitutional procedures before national and international authorities re-
sponsible for ensuring the safeguarding of human rights positions.”).  But see Kopel et al., supra note 
63, at 171–73 (arguing that the human right to self-defense under international law implies a right 
to possess some types of arms). 
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ultimately be overthrown themselves through the exercise of such a right.106  As 
Honoré puts it, “Sovereign states can hardly be expected as a matter of course to 
grant their subjects a right to secede or rebel.”107  Yet sometimes, paradoxically, 
they do. 
In this Part, we set forth two primary explanations for why states might 
adopt a right to resist in their constitution.  First, we suggest that states might adopt 
such a right as a forward-looking coordination device that precommits the nation 
to democratic rule.  Second, and potentially more troubling, we suggest the right 
might also be adopted as a backward-looking ex post legitimation of leaders who 
obtained power through undemocratic means. 
A. A Forward-Looking Right: Coordination and Precommitment 
One explanation for why constitutionmakers would enshrine a right to 
resist in their constitution is to serve as a forward-looking precommitment device 
that helps to coordinate the necessary popular response in cases of illegitimately 
exercised or formulated government authority.  To understand the notion of 
coordination, let us begin with Barry Weingast’s simple model of democracy and 
the rule of law.  Weingast models a situation in which there is one leader and two 
citizens.  The leader can form a coalition with one or the other citizen to appro-
priate wealth from the other citizen.108  Under some circumstances, however, the 
ruler may desire to impose limitations on herself, perhaps to promote economic 
development or to secure political support.109 
  
106. Cf. Tom Ginsburg & Mila Versteeg, Why Do Countries Adopt Constitutional Review? 1 (July 
2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at https://www.utexas.edu/law/academics 
/centers/clbe/wp/wp-content/uploads/centers/clbe/versteeg_why_do_countries_adopt.pdf 
(calling it an “important puzzle[] of political economy” that self-interested leaders would “constrain 
themselves by constitutional means”). 
107. Honoré, supra note 11, at 42. 
108. Barry R. Weingast, The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law, 91 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 245, 247–48 (1997) (providing a simple model of democratic rule that involves a problem of 
pure coordination due to sovereign transgressions). 
109. There is a long literature that suggests a link between constitutional constraints and economic 
development.  See, e.g., Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson, Unbundling Institutions, 113 J. POL. 
ECON. 949, 953 (2005) (suggesting that institutions with “greater constraints on politicians” are 
crucial for economic growth); Rafael La Porta et al., Judicial Checks and Balances, 112 J. POL. 
ECON. 445 (2004) (finding an empirical link between judicial constraints and economic freedom 
and property rights); Paul G. Mahoney, The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek Might Be 
Right, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 503 (2001) (finding that the common law tradition of a free market and 
limited government is associated with economic growth); Douglass C. North & Barry R. 
Weingast, Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in 
Seventeenth-Century England, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 803 (1989) (demonstrating how legal limitations 
on rulers’ arbitrary power in early capitalist Europe increased the legal security and predictability of 
external lenders who were protected by law from the seizure of their capital, and by reducing the 
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If the leader promises not to act in a certain way, what is it that makes the 
promise enforceable?  The ruler can theoretically violate any such promise with 
impunity unless the two citizens cooperate to enforce the constitutional promise.110  
Enforcement requires citizens to coordinate among themselves to reach a shared 
understanding of what exactly constitutes a violation sufficient to necessitate 
popular action.  If only one citizen thinks the leader has violated the promise and 
shows up in the street to protest, the citizen will be arrested and the leader will 
continue to violate the promise.  If both citizens show up together, however, they 
can successfully resist the violation and enforce the constitution.111 
How might such shared understandings come about?  Sometimes they may 
be facilitated by a court decision that identifies a constitutional violation.112  In 
other cases, the media may play a role.  In the recent revolutions in Egypt and 
elsewhere in the Arab world, Facebook, Twitter, and other social media allowed 
citizens to coordinate their understanding of when and where to protest.113  The 
right to resist might also play such a role.  Providing an explicit right to resist in 
the constitution should, other things being equal, facilitate coordination because 
it reminds citizens of their collective power.  If citizens know that there is a right 
to rebel, they can more easily invoke it to engage in collective action to constrain 
the rulers.114 
Because the right to resist potentially coordinates citizens, it functions as a 
precommitment device.  A ruler that lays out such a right in the constitution clear-
ly signals her willingness to abide by the constitution.  Reminding the people of 
their ultimate enforcement power in the constitutional order means that the leader 
  
risks associated with lending, capital became more readily accessible, economic growth increased, 
and the relative positions of countries where sovereigns had limited themselves improved markedly). 
110. Weingast, supra note 108, at 248 (“The structure . . . induces a problem of coordination among the 
citizens.  If all act in concert, then they can prevent transgressions.  If they fail to act in concert, then 
the sovereign can transgress the rights of citizens and survive.”). 
111. See id. at 247 (“If both A and B challenge, then the sovereign is deposed, and any attempted 
transgression is rebuffed.  If only one group challenges [the sovereign], then the challenge fails, and 
the transgression succeeds.”). 
112. See Tom Ginsburg & Richard H. McAdams, Adjudicating in Anarchy: An Expressive Theory of 
International Dispute Resolution, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1229, 1270–71 (2004) (noting that 
court decisions can serve as coordination devices); David S. Law, A Theory of Judicial Power and 
Judicial Review, 97 GEO. L.J. 723, 770–76 (2009). 
113. See Jose Antonio Vargas, Spring Awakening: How an Egyptian Revolution Began on Facebook, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 17, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/books/review/how-an-egyptian-
revolution-began-on-facebook.html (“What bubbled up online inevitably spilled onto the streets, 
starting with a series of ‘Silent Stands’ that culminated in a massive and historic rally at Tahrir 
Square in downtown Cairo.  [The Facebook page] ‘We Are All Khaled Said’ helped ignite an 
uprising that led to the resignation of President Hosni Mubarak and the dissolution of the ruling 
National Democratic Party.”). 
114. John M. Carey, Parchment, Equilibria, and Institutions, 33 COMP. POL. STUD. 735, 735–61 (2000). 
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promises not to abuse the citizens, and we might expect better performance from 
rulers who take on such burdens.  It is in this sense that the right to resist is a 
precommitment not to abuse other rights. 
Constitutions have long been conceptualized as precommitment devices 
that solve time-inconsistency problems.115  The logic is as follows: We the people 
decide now (time one) that we want a government that respects our rights.  But 
we the people also know that governments, and even popular majorities, might be 
tempted to violate rights at a later time (time two).  For this reason, we write a 
constitution that places certain values outside the realm of ordinary politics.  Pro-
tecting such values, however, requires some mechanism that forces governments 
to stick to the earlier precommitments.  In Homer’s Odyssey, Ulysses uses ropes 
to tie himself to the mast of his ship, enabling him to hear the singing of the 
sirens while mitigating the potential dangers to himself and to his crew should 
their unearthly voices render him insane.116  In the constitutional realm, the 
judiciary is typically regarded as the rope that binds us to our earlier precom-
mitment.117  But ultimately, the people themselves play this function when they 
take to the streets to resist illegitimate authority.  To the extent that the right to 
resist facilitates such collective action, it functions as a precommitment device. 
When the right to resist serves as a precommitment device, it is funda-
mentally forward looking: It is written with an eye to preventing rights abuses in 
the future.  Constitutions, in general, are regarded as forward-looking documents.  
Since the Enlightenment, and its faith in the possibility of rationally designing 
society,118 constitutions are often built on the premise that “[t]he past is a foreign 
country”119 and that drafters can design a better world.  As Enlightenment 
philosopher Thomas Paine famously put it, “A constitution is a thing antecedent 
  
115. See generally Jon Elster, Majority Rule and Individual Rights, in ON HUMAN RIGHTS: THE 
OXFORD AMNESTY LECTURES 175, 187–89 (Stephen Shute & Susan Hurley eds., 1993) 
(discussing how majority rule can infringe on individual rights owing to momentary interest and 
how constitutionalism acts as a restraint on majority rule); Stephen Holmes, Precommitment and the 
Paradox of Democracy, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY 195, 195–96 (Jon Elster & 
Rune Slagstad eds., 1988) (describing the relationship between democracy and constitutionalism in 
historical perspective). 
116. HOMER, THE ODYSSEY OF HOMER 189–90 (Richmond Lattimore trans., Harper & Row 1967). 
117. See Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional Commitment, 124 
HARV. L. REV. 657, 661 (2011) (“Judicial review is commonly portrayed as the fail-safe mechanism 
by which constitutional commitments become practically binding.”). 
118. For a brief account of the social and political context of the Enlightenment, see generally RANDALL 
LESAFFER, EUROPEAN LEGAL HISTORY: A CULTURAL AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE 372–
92 (Jan Arriens trans., 2009). 
119. This well-known phrase comes from L.P. HARTLEY, THE GO-BETWEEN 9 (7th prtg. 1963). 
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to a government, and a government is only the creature of a constitution.”120  
When precommitting to certain future goals, the past may factor into the docu-
ment as something to avoid but not as something to retain or aspire to.121 
This logic suggests that the right to resist is likely to be a feature of demo-
cratic regimes.  Democratic regimes are most likely to engage in forward-looking, 
self-binding action and to designate the people at large as the ultimate enforcer of 
constitutional rule.  Moreover, constitutionmakers may be particularly suscep-
tible to this logic of precommitment through popular resistance during demo-
cratic transitions when they are moving away from an undemocratic past.  During 
such transitions, the possibility of illegitimate government power is fresh in the 
mind of constitutional designers, and they will regard the right to resist as an 
appealing insurance policy to prevent backsliding into an undemocratic past.122  It 
is no coincidence, for example, that the state constitutions of the German Länder 
adopted a right to resist after World War II,123 while the right for all Germans to 
“resist any persons seeking to abolish this constitutional order” was later en-
shrined in the West German Federal Constitution.124  Similarly, a number of 
Eastern European countries adopted a right to resist when writing their new 
democratic constitutions in the early 1990s,125 committing to a new democratic 
  
120. THOMAS PAINE, Rights of Man, in RIGHTS OF MAN, COMMON SENSE, AND OTHER 
POLITICAL WRITINGS 83, 122 (Mark Philp ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1995) (1791). 
121. See ANDRÁS SAJÓ, LIMITING GOVERNMENT: AN INTRODUCTION TO CONSTITUTIONALISM 
1–3 (Cent. Eur. Univ. Press 1999) (suggesting that constitutions describe the future with reference 
to the past, and that “[f]ear of Nazi rule” informed the German constitution, while fear of com-
munism informed the writing of constitutions in post-communist Eastern Europe). 
122. Cf. Tom Ginsburg, Locking in Democracy: Constitutions, Commitment, and International Law, 38 
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 707, 712 (2006) (arguing that constitutional commitments to in-
ternational law “may help to ‘lock in’ democracy domestically” and prevent undemocratic backslid-
ing); Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar 
Europe, 54 INT’L ORG. 217, 230–34, 243–44 (2000) (finding, empirically, that newly established de-
mocracies are more likely to be supporters of binding rights regimes than either established 
democracies or nondemocracies, and that they are so in order to lock-in democracy). 
123. See Bielefeldt, supra note 27, at 1100 (“The right to resist was formally enshrined in some of the new 
German Land constitutions that came into being after World War II.”). 
124. GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] [BASIC 
LAW], May 23, 1949, BGBl. II, art. 20(4) (Ger.) (amended in 2010), translated in DEUTSCHER 
BUNDESTAG: BASIC LAW FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 27 (Christian 
Tomuschat et al. trans., 2010) (“All Germans shall have the right to resist any person seeking to 
abolish this constitutional order, if no other remedy is available.”). 
125. See, e.g., Ústavní zákon č. 2/1993 Sb., Ústava České Republiky [The Charter of Fundamental 
Rights and Freedoms as Part of the Constitutional Order of the Czech Republic] Dec. 16, 1992, 
art. 23 (amended by Const. Act. no. 162/1998), translated in GISBERT H. FLANZ, 
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD: THE CZECH REPUBLIC 159 (Albert 
P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1993) (“Citizens have the right to resist anybody who would 
do away with the democratic order of human rights and fundamental freedoms, established by this 
Charter, if the work of the constitutional organs or the effective use of legal means are made 
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future that would avoid repetition of their repressive pasts.126  And perhaps most 
striking, the 2003 Rwandan Constitution includes a right to resist to prevent a 
repeat of its genocidal past in the future.  Article 48 proclaims that every citizen 
“has the right to defy orders received from his/her superior authority if the orders 
constitute a serious and manifest violation of human rights and public free-
doms.”127  Thus, our first hypothesis is that constitutionmakers adopt a right to 
resist to protect democratic rule, particularly during democratic transitions when 
the right will serve as a forward-looking precommitment device to prevent undem-
ocratic backsliding. 
B. A Backward-Looking Right: Ex Post Legitimation of Dictatorial Rule 
Thus far, our analysis has focused on the right to resist as a forward-looking 
constitutional device.  To be sure, constitutions are almost universally framed as 
prospective documents, designed to secure certain goals for both the present and 
the future.  Yet there might be circumstances under which constitutionmakers 
desire to protect and legitimate the past rather than avoid repeating it in the future.  
In these instances, the right to resist is commandeered into serving a darker 
purpose: the ex post legitimation of otherwise illegal actions wherein undemo-
cratic coupmakers, caudillos, or commanders have overthrown the previous con-
stitutional order. 
The idea that constitutional development may be guided more by preoc-
cupation with the past than by planning for the future is largely foreign to 
contemporary constitutional theory.128  The idea fits, however, with an older 
constitutional theory that emerged as a conservative response to Enlightenment 
thought129 and was articulated in the works of eighteenth-century philosophers 
  
impossible.”); ÚSTAVA SLOVENSKEJ REPUBLIKY [CONSTITUTION] Oct. 1, 1992, art. 32 
(Slovk.), translated in Constitution of the Slovak Republic, CONST. CT. SLOVK., http:// 
www.concourt.sk/en/A_ustava/ustava_a.pdf (last visited Mar. 5, 2013) (“The citizens shall have 
the right to resist anyone who would abolish the democratic order of human rights and freedoms 
set in this Constitution, if the activities of constitutional authorities and the effective application of 
legal means are restrained.”). 
126. See Kim Lane Scheppele, Aspirational and Aversive Constitutionalism: The Case for Studying Cross-
Constitutional Influence Through Negative Models, 1 INT’L J. CONST. L. 296, 303 (2003) (noting 
how the Former Polish Constitutional Court Justice Lech Garlicki observed that after the fall of 
communism, there were “several hopes as to the functions to be fulfilled by the new constitutional 
instruments: to demonstrate a clear rejection of the communist past, to create legal foundations of 
the new democratic order, to describe and confirm the new identity of the nation”). 
127. CONSTITUTION DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE DU RWANDA, June 4, 2003, art. 48. 
128. But see Scheppele, supra note 126. 
129. See Mila Versteeg, Unpopular Constitutionalism, 88 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2014) (describing this 
tradition). 
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writing in the British common law tradition, most notably Edmund Burke.130  
According to this theory, constitutions are the accumulated experience of the past 
and a reflection of a nation’s history.131  To rephrase the famous words of Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, “the life” of constitutional law is not logic but experience.132  In 
continental Europe, similar ideas were propagated by Karl Friedrich von Savigny, 
who thought that law should reflect the Volksgeist, or the spirit of the nation.133  In 
this conservative conceptualization, constitutions are written to preserve the past, 
rather than to transform and transcend it.134 
These backward-looking notions of constitutionalism were largely defeated 
by the more functional and rational premises of Enlightenment ideals about 
constitutional development.135  Constitutionmaking today is usually considered 
an act of rational design, of intelligent men and women coming together and shap-
ing the world anew.136  But the fact that constitutions almost universally purport 
to be forward looking does not preclude history from affecting the constitution-
writing process in perhaps unexpected ways, as the example of the right to resist 
seems to suggest.  While normative political theorists have largely ignored this 
aspect of modern constitutionalism, it is possible that, as a sociological matter, a 
right to resist can be adopted with a retrospective rather than prospective orientation.  
In fact, an examination of the actual cases in which the right is adopted suggests 
that this right does not always coincide with a liberal democratic transition.  More 
often than not, it follows a fundamentally undemocratic event: the coup d’état. 
In Portugal, for example, the Estado Novo grabbed power through a forceful 
though bloodless military coup in 1926.137  Over the following years, former eco-
  
130. See F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 55–56 (1960) (noting that this tradition 
“was made explicit mainly by a group of Scottish moral philosophers led by David Hume, Adam 
Smith, and Adam Ferguson, seconded by their English contemporaries Josiah Tucker, Edmund 
Burke, and William Paley, and drawing largely on a tradition rooted in the jurisprudence of the 
common law” (footnote omitted)). 
131. See EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 66 (L.G. Mitchell ed., 
Oxford Univ. Press 1993) (1790). 
132. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 5 (Transaction Publishers 2005) (1881). 
133. See FREDERICK CHARLES VON SAVIGNY, OF THE VOCATION OF OUR AGE FOR 
LEGISLATION AND JURISPRUDENCE 30 (Abraham Hayward trans., Arno Press 1975) (1831). 
134. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Social and Economic Rights? Lessons From South Africa 4 (Chi. Pub. Law & 
Legal Theory Working Paper No. 12, 2001), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf? 
abstract_id=269657 (distinguishing between “transformative” and “preservative” constitutions). 
135. Cf. Harold J. Berman, The Historical Foundations of Law, 54 EMORY L.J. 13, 16–17 (2005) 
(describing how the historical tradition lead by Von Savigny became an important school of 
thought in the nineteenth century but diminished in the twentieth century). 
136. See HAYEK, supra note 130, at 57. 
137. See LIBRARY OF CONG., FED. RESEARCH DIV., PORTUGAL: A COUNTRY STUDY 54 (Eric 
Solsten ed., 2d ed. 1994) (“The coup d’état was bloodless because no military units came to the aid 
of the government.”). 
1214 60 UCLA L. REV. 1184 (2013) 
 
 
nomics professor Antonio de Oliveira de Salazar emerged as the leader of the 
new regime and decided to single-handedly write a new constitution138 to con-
solidate and implement his vision of the “New State.”139  The resulting docu-
ment, ratified into law in 1933, was essentially a decorative fiction enumerating 
and delineating myriad rights that were never actually respected in practice.140  
Yet prominently positioned among the rights was the “[t]he right of resistance to 
any order which may infringe individual guarantees,”141 which is exactly how the 
Estado Novo had itself come into existence almost a decade before. 
Or consider the case of Ghana.  In the summer of 1979, Flight Lieutenant 
Jerry Rawlings and his Armed Forces Revolutionary Council overthrew Ghana’s 
Supreme Military Council, which had been transitioning the country toward 
democratic rule and was writing a new popular constitution.142  Rawlings exe-
cuted a large number of those who had been in a position of power during the 
previous period and gained full control over the country.143  In the course of 
substantially amending the constitutional document that had been drafted only 
months previously, Rawlings introduced the right to resist.144 
Likewise, in 1945, Guatemalan dictator Jorge Ubico was forced from power 
through popular protests.145  The country was briefly ruled by an associate ap-
pointed by Ubico but quickly experienced another coup d’état when a joint 
civilian-military junta took control of the government.146  Following the coup, 
  
138. Id. at 56 (stating that Salazar dictated the 1933 Constitution). 
139. See FILIPE RIBEIRO DE MENESES, SALAZAR: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY 105–06 (2009). 
140. See id. at 106–07 (“[W]hile there were many guarantees of civil and political rights, all of these were 
subjected to a number of conditions that were shamelessly exploited by the executive.”). 
141. CONSTITUÏÇAO POLÍTICA DA REPÚBLICA PORTUGUESA [C.R.P.] [CONSTITUTION] Feb. 22, 
1933, art. 8(19) (Port.) (amended Dec. 21, 1936), translated in 136 BRITISH AND FOREIGN 
STATE PAPERS 56 (1938). 
142. LIBRARY OF CONG., FED. RESEARCH DIV., GHANA: A COUNTRY STUDY 45–47 (LaVerle 
Berry ed., 3d ed. 1995) (noting that after the constitutional commission had submitted an 
“approved draft” of the new constitution, “[a]ll appeared set for a new attempt at constitutional 
government in July, when a group of young army officers overthrew the SMC government in June 
1979”). 
143. Id. at 47 (observing that Rawlings executed “former heads of military governments” including 
“leading members of the SMC” who were in power before the coup). 
144. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA, Sept. 18, 1979, art. 1(3) (“All citizens of Ghana 
shall have the right to resist any person or persons seeking to abolish the constitutional order as 
established by this Constitution should no other remedy be possible.”). 
145. LIBRARY OF CONG., FED. RESEARCH DIV., GUATEMALA: A COUNTRY STUDY 22 (Richard F. 
Nyrop ed., 2d ed. 1983) (“The downfall of Ubico came about in classical fashion when the dictator 
escalated a conflict growing out of a student demonstration until most of the urban population 
turned against him.”). 
146. Id. (“[Ubico] transferred power to an associate, Juan Federico Ponce Vaides, . . . but intensified 
popular resistance led to open fighting in October [of 1944].  Ponce was forced to resign and was 
replaced by a joint civil-military junta.”). 
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the new military regime quickly adopted a new constitution147 and enshrined a 
provision that declared that “[a]dequate resistance for the protection of the indi-
vidual rights . . . is legitimate.”148  The army later invoked legal obligations to 
justify the 1982 coup.149 
Hugo Chavez provides an example of a democratically elected leader who 
may have embraced the right to resist in hopes of absolving himself of illegal acts 
committed prior to his consolidation of power.  In 1992, Chavez spearheaded an 
attempted coup against the government of Venezuela, then headed by Carlos 
Andres Perez.150  The plot miscarried and Chavez served time in jail for his role, 
although the young officer remained a hero to many Venezuelans opposed to the 
perceived corruption and cronyism of the Perez government.151  Following his 
release, Chavez rode this wave of popularity into the presidential office, despite 
  
147. See MARIO ROSENTHAL, GUATEMALA: THE STORY OF AN EMERGENT LATIN-AMERICAN 
DEMOCRACY 216 (1962) (noting that in the first five months following the coup, “the consti-
tution was repealed” and “a new constitution was drawn up,” which was approved “on March 13[, 
1945], a mere two days before the inauguration”). 
148. CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE GUATEMALA [CONSTITUTION] Mar. 11, 
1945, art. 50, translated in 145 BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 1121 (1953).  Note that 
Guatemala expanded the purview of this provision in 1965 following another coup.  
CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA DE GUATEMALA DECRETADA POR LA ASAMBLEA 
NACIONAL CONSTITUYENTE EN 15 SEPTIEMBRE DE 1965 [CONSTITUTION] Sept. 15, 1965, 
art. 77, translated in 4 AMOS J. PEASLEE & DOROTHY PEASLEE XYDIS, CONSTITUTIONS OF 
NATIONS 578 (PanAmerican Union trans., rev. 3d ed. 1970) (“The rights and guarantees granted 
by the Constitution do not exclude others which, although not expressly indicated therein, are 
inherent in the human person.  Laws and governmental orders or those of any other kind that 
regulate the exercise of rights guaranteed by the Constitution shall be null and void ipso jure if they 
diminish, restrict, or distort such rights.”). 
149. While technically differentiated from their use in ratified national constitutions, the use of right-to-
resist justifications within provisional constitutions and constitutional suspension decrees that 
follow an extralegal seizure of power can be highly informative as to the legitimation pressures faced 
by their authors.  See, e.g., Fundamental Statute of Government, Decree Law 24–82, Apr. 27, 
1982, pmbl. (Guat.) (“[T]he Army of Guatemala, in fulfillment of its obligations to the Nation, 
echoing the feelings of the people and seeking to safeguard the national honor, deposed the ruling 
regime, the outgrowth of a system completely oblivious of legality that brought the country into a 
state of anarchy and international isolation which with disregard of human life, of honesty in the 
management of public affairs, and of the rights of citizens, culminated in an election vitiated by 
fraud.”); see also Zafar Ali Shah v. Musharraf, (2000) 52 PLD (SC) 869, 885 (Pak.) (noting that 
“[i]n the context of the present case the terms coup d’état and revolution are interchangeable and 
nothing substantial would turn on considering it from one angle or another” and citing several 
other cases). 
150. NIKOLAS KOZLOFF, HUGO CHÁVEZ: OIL, POLITICS, AND THE CHALLENGE TO THE 
UNITED STATES 47 (2006) (describing how “[o]n February 4, 1992, Lieutenant Colonel Chávez 
. . . and 6,000 troops attacked Caracas and three other cities,” attempting to overthrow the 
government run by Carlos Andrés Pérez). 
151. See RICHARD GOTT, HUGO CHÁVEZ AND THE BOLIVARIAN REVOLUTION 67 (2d ed. 2005) 
(noting that after the failed coup Chavez was converted “into someone perceived as the country’s 
potential saviour”). 
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significant criticisms of his previous role in attempting to subvert the democratic 
order.152  One of his first acts was to oversee the design of a new constitution to 
replace the Venezuelan constitution of 1961, and it included a brand-new right-
to-resist provision: “The people of Venezuela, true to their republican tradition 
and their struggle for independence, peace and freedom, shall disown any regime, 
legislation or authority that violates democratic values, principles and guarantees 
or encroaches upon human rights.”153 
In all these cases, it appears that the right to resist came about because 
constitutionmakers sought to justify their earlier actions ex post.  Rulers that 
themselves came to power through some sort of extraconstitutional means, such 
as a coup or revolution, may be more likely to include a right to resist as a way of 
validating their own historical experience.  Rather than seek a full break with the 
past, the right to resist may allow present day rulers to co-opt it, positioning their 
current leadership roles as not only legitimate but inevitable.  Together, these 
propositions about the right to resist lead us to surmise that rights to resist will be 
more common for countries that recently experienced a coup. 
C. Summary 
We thus have two very different possible justifications for a right to resist 
in national constitutions.  Democratic regimes, we surmise, will generally adopt 
rights to resist for forward-looking reasons.  The people serve as the ultimate au-
thority in such regimes, and the prospect of citizen resistance will help protect the 
regime against backsliding.  The government precommits to abiding by the con-
stitution, looking ahead to the future.  In contrast, those who come to power 
through unconstitutional means may themselves seek to justify their actions ex 
post by evoking a right to resist.  We characterize this as a backward-looking 
justification.  These are two very different rationales with very different political 
logics. 
To be sure, the distinctions between forward-looking and backward-looking 
adoptions of the right to resist are differences in emphasis, not in kind.  A 
coupmaker who adopts a right to resist to justify his own seizure of power may 
also be trying to motivate citizens to help protect the new regime against future 
  
152. El Antiguo Golpista Chávez Anuncia un Nuevo Proceso Constituyente en Venezuela [Former Coup 
Leader Chavez Announces New Constitutional Creation Process in Venezuela], EL PAÍS, Dec. 8, 
1998, http://elpais.com/diario/1998/12/08/portada/913071604_850215.html. 
153. CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA BOLIVARIANA DE VENEZUELA [CONSTITUTION] Dec. 20, 
1999, art. 350, translated in WORLD CONSTITUTIONS ILLUSTRATED 78 (Jefri Jay Ruchti ed., 2010). 
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coups.154  In this sense, the right to resist may play an insurance function for au-
tocrats as well as for democrats.  Likewise, democratic regimes are often informed 
by a past they seek to avoid.  They are oriented toward the future but may be more 
likely to adopt a right to resist if they have a particularly oppressive past. 
IV. THE RIGHT TO RESIST IN THE WORLD’S CONSTITUTIONS 
Empirical analysis of why states adopt a right to resist requires data on which 
countries adopted the right to resist and when.  To collect such data, we analyzed 
every national constitution written over the past 230 years, since the adoption of 
the U.S. Articles of Confederation in 1781 up until 2011.155  For each constitu-
tion, the text of the entire document was analyzed to determine whether the doc-
ument includes the right to resist.  The various general coding rules necessary to 
quantify written constitutions are described in greater detail in our earlier work.156 
A. The Global Spread of the Right to Resist 
Analysis of the data shows that the right to resist is a common feature of the 
world’s constitutions.  As can be seen from Figure 1, in the early eighteenth cen-
tury, no less than 25 percent of all constitutions contained a right to overthrow 
the government.  Since the mid-eighteenth century, we see a decline in the 
proportion of constitutions that contain such a right, mostly as a result of the pro-
liferation of new countries and constitutional systems for which the right was not 
included.  In absolute terms, however, the number of countries with such consti-
tutional provisions has continued to grow. 
For over a century, a mere 5 percent of all constitutions included the right to 
resist.  It is only in the second part of the twentieth century that the right to resist 
began to spread more widely, to about 10 percent in the 1980s and about 20 
  
154. See, e.g., CONSTITUTION DE LA IVE REPUBLIQUE, Oct. 14, 1992, art. 45 (Togo), translated in 
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 9 (Gisbert H. Flanz ed., 2004) (“All 
citizens have the duty to combat any person or group of persons who would try to change by force 
the democratic order established by this Constitution.”). 
155. This data were collected as part of the Comparative Constitutions Project (CCP).  See COMP. 
CONSTITUTIONS PROJECT, http://www.comparativeconstitutionsproject.org (last visited Mar. 6, 
2013).  We crosschecked the CCP coding against an independent coding of all written 
constitutions since 1946 by Versteeg.  See generally Law & Versteeg, supra note 2. 
156. See ZACHARY ELKINS ET AL., THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS 48–51 
(2009); Goderis & Versteeg, supra note 2, at 29–35; Law & Versteeg, supra note 2, at 1183–86 & 
nn.85–98. 
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percent today.  In April of 2012, Hungary became the latest nation to adopt the 
right to resist.157 
 
FIGURE 1.  Percentage of Countries With the Right to Resist in Constitution 
 
Figure 2 depicts the same information on a set of world maps at thirty-year 
intervals, for the years 1920, 1950, 1980, and 2010.  The maps again illustrate the 
strong growth over time in the number of countries that include the right to 
resist.  More important, however, the maps also show that this provision appears 
to be geographically clustered in Latin America, Africa, and Western Europe.  
By contrast, we find fewer constitutions that include this right in Asia. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
157. See A MAGYAR KÖZTÁRSASÁG ALKOTMÁNYA [CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF 
HUNGARY] Apr. 25, 2011 art. C(2), translated in THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF HUNGARY 
(Éva Borókainé Vajdovits ed., 2011) (“No person’s activity shall be aimed at the forcible 
acquisition, exercise or exclusive possession of power.  Every person shall be entitled and obligated 
to act against such attempts in a lawful way.”). 
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FIGURE 2.  Countries With the Right to Resist in Constitution in 1920, 
1950, 1980, and 2010 
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B. Internal Variation Within Right-to-Resist Provisions 
In some cases we have been forced to pick and choose what to consider a 
right-to-resist provision for the purposes of this study.  While some scholars have 
identified as a right to resist only those clauses in which an individual or collective 
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group is allowed to defend their own rights against state encroachment,158 we 
have also included those provisions that allow for rebellion in the case of con-
stitutional upheaval.  For example, the Constitution of Azerbaijan states that 
every citizen “has the right himself to stand up to the attempt of rebellion against 
the state or state coup.”159  We thus adopt a broad definition of right-to-resist 
provisions as constitutional text enumerating a right to act against the govern-
ment under certain circumstances. 
Likewise, we encountered some important dimensions of variation while 
exploring the content of right-to-resist provisions in the world’s written consti-
tutions.  One important dimension along which provisions vary is their justifying 
rationale.  Moreover, constitutions vary in the conditions predicate to the right to 
resist coming into effect, in whether the provision creates a discretionary positive 
right or a concrete constitutional obligation, and in the scope of permitted resis-
tance.  Finally there exists variation in whether the language creates a positive 
right, meaning a permission to act a certain way, or a negative right, meaning 
only inaction is allowed—for example, ignoring an illegitimate government 
order.  This Subpart briefly explores these internal variations within right-to-
resist provisions. 
1. The Rebel’s Trinity: Three Justifications for the Right to Resist 
The justifying rationales behind constitutional right-to-resist provisions fall 
into three distinct groupings: (1) those that invoke a natural right trumping con-
stitutional law; (2) those that create a citizen obligation to resist an overthrow of 
the current order; and (3) those that allow for the defense of individual rights 
against illegitimate actions or abuses undertaken by the state. 
a. Natural Law 
Right-to-resist provisions with a natural law character subordinate the 
existing constitution, and by extension those preceding it, to some greater law or 
truth.  The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for example, seems to as-
sume a natural law right to resist, stating the following in its preamble: “Whereas 
it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to 
rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected 
  
158. See, e.g., Kopel et al., supra note 63, at 138 (listing countries with constitutional right-to-resist 
provisions within the context of armed and unarmed self-defense). 
159. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN, art. 54(II), available at http:// 
azerbaijan.az/portal/General/Constitution/doc/constitution_e.pdf. 
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by the rule of law . . . [t]he General Assembly Proclaims this Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights . . . .”160 
It is possible that right-to-resist provisions of the natural law variety are 
associated in the modern era with regimes that came about through a coup.  By 
recognizing a legal order that trumps even the constitution, these provisions can 
offer a Lockean justification for having overthrown the previous regime.  Ex-
amples such as those of Ghana, Guatemala, and Venezuela outlined in Part II.B 
would fall under this rubric.  Another might be Cuba’s Constitution of 1940.  In 
1933, a group of army commanders overthrew Cuban president Gerardo Machado 
in an uprising known as the Sergeants’ Revolt.161  Among them was a young 
Fulgencio Batista.162  By the time a new constitution was drafted to replace the 
defunct 1901 constitution following its seven-year suspension, Batista was firmly 
in control and the new Cuban constitution would include a right to resist based 
on natural rights.163 
b. Constitutional Defense 
In other cases, the right to resist is framed as a defense of the current consti-
tutional order by calling on the citizenry to oppose those who aim to overthrow it.  
This type of right-to-resist provision forms a kind of insurance policy, in which 
the current government seeks to protect itself.  The government assumes that the 
current order is the one that is legitimate and that those who aim to overthrow 
the current order conduct illegitimate government action.  Thus, the population 
is empowered to act only against authorities outside the current regime, should 
those authorities come to power, not against the regime propagating the consti-
tution at the time of its drafting. 
  
160. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III), at 
72–72 (Dec. 10, 1948). 
161. See LOUIS A. PÉREZ, JR., CUBA AND THE UNITED STATES: TIES OF SINGULAR INTIMACY 
193 (3d ed. 2003) (discussing the “Sergeants Revolt” [sic]). 
162. Id. 
163. CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CUBA [CONSTITUTION] Oct. 10, 1940, art. 40, 
translated in WORLD CONSTITUTIONS ILLUSTRATED: CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF 
CUBA 1940, at 11 (Jefri Jay Ruchti ed., Anna I Vellvé Torras trans., 2010) (“The legal, govern-
mental provisions or [those] of any other order which regulate the exercise of the rights which this 
Constitution guarantees, will be null if they diminish, restrict or corrupt . . . them.  Adequate 
resistance for the protection of the individual rights previously guaranteed is legitimate.  The action 
to prosecute infringements of this Title is public, without bond or formality of any kind, . . . and by 
a simple denunciation.  The enumeration of the rights guaranteed in this Title does not exclude the 
others that this Constitution establishes, nor others of analogous nature or that are derived from the 
principle of the sovereignty of the people and from the republican form of government.” (first 
alteration in original)). 
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An example is the constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany, amend-
ed in 1968 to provide that “[a]ll Germans shall have the right to resist any person 
seeking to abolish this constitutional order, if no other remedy is available.”164  
The 1993 Constitution of the Czech Republic similarly provided that “[c]itizens 
have the right to resist any person who would do away with the democratic order 
of human rights and fundamental freedoms, established by the Charter, if the 
work of the constitutional organs and effective use of legal means are made im-
possible.”165 
Another example of such a provision comes from the Argentine Constitution 
of 1956, which states:  
This Constitution shall rule even when its observance is inter-
rupted by acts of force against the institutional order and the demo-
cratic system.  These acts shall be irreparably null. 
. . . . 
Those who, as a consequence of these acts, were to assume the 
powers foreseen for the authorities of this Constitution or for those of 
the provinces, shall be punished with the same penalties and shall be 
civil [sic] and criminally liable for their acts. . . .  
All citizens shall have the right to oppose resistance to those com-
mitting the acts of force stated in this section.166 
Ironically, though, this provision remained a part of each of the four Argentine 
constitutional revisions since its initial inclusion, spanning a tumultuous period of 
coups and rebellions over the latter half of the twentieth century.  The consti-
tutional text clearly did not prevent new coupmakers from replacing the old ones. 
c. Self-Defense 
In a third set of cases, the justification for inclusion of the right to resist is 
one of self-defense.  This justification is similar to natural law in that it establishes 
  
164. See GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] 
[BASIC LAW] May 23, 1949, BGBl. II, art. 20(4) (Ger.) (amended in 2010), translated in 
DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: BASIC LAW FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 27 
(Christian Tomuschat et al. trans., 2010). 
165. Ústavní zákon č. 2/1993 Sb., Ústava České Republiky [The Charter of Fundamental Rights and 
Freedoms as Part of the Constitutional Order of the Czech Republic] Dec. 16, 1992, art. 23 
(amended by Const. Act. no. 162/1998), translated in GISBERT H. FLANZ, CONSTITUTIONS OF 
THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD: THE CZECH REPUBLIC 159 (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert 
H. Flanz eds., 1993). 
166. Art. 36, CONSTITUCIÓN NACIONAL [CONST. NAC.] (Arg.), translated in Constitution of the 
Argentine Nation, SENADO DE LA NACIÓN ARGENTINA, http://www.senado.gov.ar/web/ 
interes/constitucion/english.php (last visited Apr. 17, 2013). 
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the right to act against the current constitutional order under certain circum-
stances.  Whereas natural law provisions, however, allow for people to rise in 
rebellion against the system itself, overthrowing it if necessary should it become 
tyrannical or illegitimate, self-defense merely allows for people to oppose actions 
undertaken by government agents in violation of existing law.  Often these provi-
sions will diverge from natural law in terms of scope, empowering only individual 
action against individual agents rather than collective action against the state 
itself.  One example of such a right can be found in one of the world’s oldest 
rights documents, the 1791 French Declaration of the Rights of Man, which 
states that “[e]very act exercised against a man to which the cases in the law do 
not apply, and in which its forms are not observed, is arbitrary and tyrannical.  
Respect for the law forbids him to submit to such acts; and if attempts are made 
to execute them by violence, he has a right to repel force by force.”167 
Another example can be found in El Salvador’s 1983 Constitution, which 
curtails its “right . . . to insurrection” in cases of “serious” government violations of 
constitutionally established rights in the following fashion: “The exercise of this 
right shall not produce the abrogation nor the reform of this Constitution, and 
shall be limited to the removal insofar as necessary of transgressing officials, 
replacing them in a transitory manner until they are substituted in the form estab-
lished by this Constitution.”168 
d. Hybrid Justifications 
Of course, there are significant overlaps among the three justifications, and 
many countries will include more than one within a single provision169 or consti-
tution.170  This can, at times, invite confusion.  For example, after Manuel Zelaya 
  
167. 1791 CONST. art. 12 (Fr.), translated in 4 THE POLITICAL STATE OF EUROPE, FOR THE YEAR 
MDCCXCIII 176 (1793).  A more modern example can be found in the Portuguese Constitution 
of 1976.  CONSTITUÏÇAO POLÍTICA DA REPÚBLICA PORTUGUESA [CONSTITUTION] Apr. 25, 
1976, art. 21 (Port.), translated in OFFICE OF THE SEC’Y OF STATE FOR MASS COMMC’N, 
CONSTITUTION OF THE PORTUGUESE REPUBLIC 24 (1977 (“Everyone shall have the right to 
resist any order that infringes his rights, freedoms or safeguards and to repel by force any form of 
aggression when recourse to public authority is impossible.”). 
168. CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA DE EL SALVADOR [CONSTITUTION] Dec. 15, 1983, art. 
87 (amended July 10, 1996), translated in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE 
WORLD: REPUBLIC OF EL SALVADOR 18 (Gisbert H. Flanz ed., Reka Koerner trans., 1998). 
169. See id. (justifying both constitutional defense, in addition to self-defense for government violations 
of its own laws). 
170. Venezuela, for example, establishes a right to Constitutional Defense in Article 333, alongside the 
aforementioned article 350.  Compare CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA BOLIVARIANA DE 
VENEZUELA, Dec. 20, 1999, art. 333, translated in WORLD CONSTITUTIONS ILLUSTRATED: 
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was removed as president of Honduras in 2009, both the exiled president and 
the new regime invoked, as a legal justification for their right to rule, Article 3 of the 
1982 Constitution, which proclaims:  
No one owes allegiance to a usurping government nor to those who 
assume office or public service by force of arms or by using means or 
procedures which violate or ignore the provisions established by this 
Constitution and other laws.  The acts adopted by such authorities are 
null.  The people have the right to resort to insurrection in defense of 
the constitutional order.171 
In 2009, the exiled Zelaya invoked Article 3 using the rationale of constitutional 
defense, arguing that the constitutional provision required that the new regime be 
declared illegitimate and that he be restored.172  For their part, congressional allies 
of the new government argued that Article 3 should actually be interpreted as a 
natural law–type provision justifying the removal of Zelaya as a legitimate “in-
surrection” in light of Zelaya’s seeking to subvert the constitutional order while 
president.173 
  
VENEZUELA (Jefri Jay Ruchti ed., Ministry of Commc’n & Info. of the Bol. Republic of Venez. 
trans., 2010), with id. art. 350. 
171. CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE HONDURAS, Jan. 11, 1982, art. 3, translated 
in CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF HONDURAS 1982, at 1–2 (Gen. Secretariat, Org. of 
Am. States ed., 1982). 
172. See Zelaya Llama a la Insurreción en Honduras [Zelaya Calls for Insurrection in Honduras], EL PAÍS, 
July 15, 2009, http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2009/07/15/actualidad/1247608802_ 
850215.html (“La insurrección es un derecho del pueblo que está consignado en el artículo 3 de la 
Constitución de Honduras, y los hondureños deben hacer valer sus derechos constitucionales.” 
[“Insurrection is a right of the people enshrined in article 3 of the Constitution of Honduras—the people 
should make their rights count.”] (quoting Manuel Zelaya) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
173. See Decreto de Destitución de Zelaya/Comunicado Poder Judicial Explicando Irregularidades [Official 
Decree of Dismisal for Zelaya/Judicial Authority Explains Irregularities], LA GACETA, July 1, 2009, 
available at http://asjhonduras.com/cms/docs/golpe/2009-08-10-DecretoCongreso.pdf (“Artículo 
1.—El Congreso Nacional en aplicación de los artículos 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 40 numeral 4), 205 numeral 
20) y 218 numeral 3), 242, 321, 322 y 323 de la Constitución de la República, acuerda: 1) Improbar 
la conducta del Presidente de la República, ciudadano José Manuel Zelaya Rosales, por las 
reiteradas violaciones a la Constitución de la República y las leyes y la inobservancia de las 
resoluciones y sentencias de los órganos jurisdiccionales.  2) Separar al ciudadano José Manuel 
Zelaya Rosales, del cargo del Presidente Constitucional de la República de Honduras.” [“Article 1: 
The National congress in following with articles 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 40, 205/20, and 218/3, 242, 321, 322, and 
323 of the Constitution of the Republic decrees that: 1) Official misconduct has been sanctioned upon the 
President of the Republic, citizen José Manuel Zelaya Rosales, for the abovementioned violations of the 
Constitution of the Republic and the laws and observances of its resolutions, sentences and authorities.  B) 
Citizen José Manuel Zelaya Rosales has been removed from the position of constitutionally appointed 
president of Honduras.”]).  It may also be worth mentioning that while Zelaya himself seemingly 
placed considerable stock in Article 3’s right to insurrection when calling upon the population to 
rise on his behalf, the Micheletti government did not seem to give this much credence.  When the 
new government declared a state of emergency and temporarily suspended several constitutional 
rights following Zelaya’s clandestine return to the country, Article 3 was not among them.  See Elisabeth 
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2. Other Dimensions of Variation: Conditions Predicate, Right Versus 
Duty, and Scope 
In addition to varying in their justifying rationale, constitutional right-to-
resist provisions also vary in the conditions predicate to the right coming into 
effect, in whether the provision creates a right or an obligation to resistance, and 
in the scope and extent of the resistance that is permitted.  The remainder of this 
Part discusses each of these in turn. 
In most cases, right-to-resist provisions will identify a condition predicate in 
which the citizenry is entitled or obligated to act against the system established 
in the rest of the constitution.  Sometimes rights to resist are quite general, predi-
cated on nothing greater than the essential humanity of the people.  These justi-
fications are particularly common in rights justified by an appeal to natural law.  
An example of this is the 1965 Constitution of Guatemala, Article 77 of which 
states:  
The rights and guarantees granted by the Constitution do not 
exclude others, which, although not expressly indicated therein, are 
inherent in the human person. 
Laws and governmental orders or those of any other kind that 
regulate the exercise of rights guaranteed by the Constitution shall be 
null and void ipso jure if they diminish, restrict, or distort such rights.174 
Other constitutions specify that the exercise of the right to resist is con-
tingent upon a certain type of national crisis emerging.  In the case of consti-
tutional defense provisions, these crises often involve some attempt to overthrow 
the regime or the constitution, or an invasion of the state from abroad.  For exam-
ple, Article 66 of the 1990 Constitution of Benin states: 
In the case of a coup d’état, of [sic] a putsch, of aggression by 
mercenaries or of any coup of force whatever, any member of a con-
stitutional organ has the right and the duty to make use of [faire appel] 
all means to reestablish the constitutional legitimacy[,] including the 
recourse to existing military cooperation or defense agreements. 
  
Malkin & Ginger Thompson, Honduras Shuts Down 2 Media Outlets, Then Relents, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 29, 2009, at A10; Pablo Ordaz, Micheletti Ordena el Cierre de los Medios de Comunicación Afines 
a Zelaya [Micheletti Orders the Closing of Media Channels Friendly to Zelaya], EL PAÍS, Sept. 28, 
2009, http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2009/09/28/actualidad/1254088802_850215.html. 
174. CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA DE GUATEMALA DECRETADA POR LA ASAMBLEA 
NACIONAL CONSTITUYENTE EN 15 SEPTIEMBRE DE 1965, art. 77, translated in 4 AMOS J. 
PEASLEE & DOROTHY PEASLEE XYDIS, CONSTITUTIONS OF NATIONS 578 (PanAmerican 
Union trans., rev. 3d ed. 1970). 
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In these circumstances, for all Beninese, to disobey and to orga-
nize to defeat the illegitimate authority constitutes the most sacred of 
rights and the most imperative of duties.175 
But in some cases the national crisis could also be government tyranny or abuse, 
as is the case for the 1983 El Salvador Constitution.  Article 88 states that “[t]he 
principle that a President cannot succeed himself [alternabilidad] is indispensable 
for the maintenance of the established form of government and political system.  
Violation of this norm makes insurrection an obligation.”176 
Constitutions also vary in the extent to which resistance is considered a right 
or an obligation.  Each constitution will attempt to define whether resistance is 
an option, the exercise of which depends on the citizens’ willingness and pref-
erences, or a duty, wherein the people are required to act under certain conditions.  
Constitutional provisions run the spectrum from the aforementioned “most 
sacred of rights and the most imperative of duties”177 to that of a right to assemble 
peacefully.178 
A final dimension along which constitutions vary is the scope of what is 
permissible under the right.  More conservative approaches to the right might 
allow for a citizen only to disobey or resist an order—essentially a negative 
right.179  Alternately, they may allow for resistance only as long as the actions 
constituting that resistance would not themselves be illegal otherwise—a positive 
  
175. CONSTITUTION DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE DU BENIN, Dec. 11, 1990, art. 66, translated in WORLD 
CONSTITUTIONS ILLUSTRATED: BENIN 14 (Jefri Jay Ruchti ed. & trans., 2011) (alterations in original). 
176. CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA DE EL SALVADOR, Dec. 15, 1983, art. 87 (amended July 
10, 1996), translated in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD: REPUBLIC OF 
EL SALVADOR 18 (Gisbert H. Flanz ed., Reka Koerner trans., 1998). 
177. CONSTITUTION DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE DU BENIN, Dec. 11, 1990, art. 66, translated in WORLD 
CONSTITUTIONS ILLUSTRATED: BENIN 14 (Jefri Jay Ruchti ed. & trans., 2011); CONSTITUTION 
DE LA IVE REPUBLIQUE, Oct. 14, 1992, art. 150 (Togo) (amended to Feb. 7, 2007), translated in 
WORLD CONSTITUTIONS ILLUSTRATED: TOGO 33 (Jefri Jay Ruchti ed. & trans., 2011). 
178. BUREAU OF COMM. & THE SECRETARIAT OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, RATTHA 
THAMMANUN HAENG RATCHA ANACHAK THAI [CONSTITUTION] Aug. 24, 2007, sec. 63, 
translated in CONSTITUTION OF THE KINGDOM OF THAILAND 25 (2007), available at 
http://www.senate.go.th/th_senate/English/constitution2007.pdf. 
179. CONSTITUIÇÃO DA REPÚBLICA DEMOCRÁTICA DE TIMOR-LESTE [CONSTITUTION] Mar. 
22, 2002, sec. 28, translated in INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, CONSTITUTION OF THE 
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF EAST TIMOR, available at http://www.icrc.org/IHL-NAT.NSF/ 
162d151af444ded44125673e00508141/127ced8944679aa5c12570910031f468/$FILE/Constituti
on%20Timor%20-%20EN.pdf (“Every citizen has the right to disobey and to resist illegal orders or 
orders that affect their fundamental rights, freedoms and guarantees.”). 
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right albeit a limited one.180  At the other extreme would be those constitutions 
that explicitly allow for the use of force or armed insurrection.181 
These dimensions of variation are broad conceptualizations, not watertight 
classifications.  Not all right-to-resist provisions can be neatly classified along each 
of those dimensions.  In addition, the total number of right-to-resist provisions 
in the world’s constitutions is not large enough to analyze internal variation using 
statistical methods.  The empirical analysis that follows focuses on the question of 
why a right-to-resist provision is adopted, and it ignores the intricacies of the 
drafting style.  At the same time, Appendix I lists the full text of all historical and 
contemporary right-to-resist provisions that we encountered in the world’s written 
constitutions. 
V. WHAT PREDICTS THE ADOPTION OF THE RIGHT TO RESIST? 
Over the course of the past 200 years, we see a growing number of states 
that constitutionally mandate the people to overthrow their government in the 
case of illegitimate government actions.  Why do countries adopt a right to resist 
in their constitutions?  To answer this question we turn to regression analysis.  
Regression analysis enables us to test whether different variables predict the adop-
tion of this right while controlling for the presence of other factors.182  Of course, 
causal questions on the determinants of any constitutional right are notoriously 
complex and difficult to resolve in a cross-country empirical analysis.183  To know 
that a particular variable predicts whether a country is more likely to adopt a right 
to resist does not necessarily tell us whether the variable in question actually 
influences adoption of the right to resist or merely correlates with it.  Never-
theless, correlations can shed light on the plausibility of certain hypotheses and 
  
180. HAYASTANI HANRAPETUT’YAN SAHMANADRUT’YUN [CONSTITUTION] July 5, 1995, art. 18b (amended 
Nov. 17, 2005) (Arm.), translated in  CONSTITUTION  OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA (“Everyone 
shall have a right to protect his/her rights and freedoms by any means not prohibited by the law.”). 
181. CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE HONDURAS, Jan. 11, 1982, art. 3, translated 
in CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF HONDURAS 1982, at 1–2 (Gen. Secretariat, Org. of 
Am. States ed., 1982) (“No one owes allegiance to a usurping government nor to those who assume 
office or public service by force of arms or by using means or procedures which violate or ignore the 
provisions established by this Constitution and other laws.  The acts adopted by such authorities 
are null.  The people have the right to resort to insurrection in defense of the constitutional order.”). 
182. See Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 77, 79 (2002) (stressing 
the need for researchers to evaluate and reject alternative explanations for their findings by employing 
“control variables” that account for those alternative explanations). 
183. See Anne Meuwese & Mila Versteeg, Quantitative Methods for Comparative Constitutional Law, in 
PRACTICE AND THEORY IN COMPARATIVE LAW 230 (Maurice Adams & Jacco Bomhoff eds., 
2012) (discussing the difficulty of distinguishing correlation from causation). 
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inform subsequent interpretations of why countries adopt right-to-resist 
provisions.184 
A. The Actions of Democratic Regimes and Coupmakers 
In Part III, we developed two main hypotheses for why constitutionmakers 
would allow their citizens to rise up against illegitimate government power by 
adopting a right to resist.  First, we hypothesized that the right would be asso-
ciated with democratic regimes but that constitutionmakers might be particularly 
likely to adopt such a right during democratic transitions, and that in these cases 
the right serves as a precommitment device that might coordinate citizens to 
enforce the constitution against illegitimate government rule.  Second, and in 
contrast with the first hypothesis, we surmised that constitutionmakers might 
adopt a right to resist after a fundamentally undemocratic coup, when coupmakers 
want to justify and legitimate their actions ex post. 
To test these hypotheses, we estimate a simple regression model to explain 
when countries adopt the right to resist in some form.185  In this model, the 
dependent variable takes the value of zero prior to the year any given country 
adopts the right to resist, the value one in the year the country adopts a right to 
resist, and is missing after adoption.186  The model includes the following predictor 
  
184. David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, Sham Constitutions, 101 CAL. L. REV. 101, 157 (2013) 
(discussing how mere correlations can be useful to understand developments in the world's 
constitutions).  
185. To be specific, we implemented a linear probability model, which is an ordinary least squares model 
for a binary dependent variable.  See JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIGE, INTRODUCTORY ECONOMETRICS 
246 (2002) (describing the basic assumptions underlying the linear probability model).  The fact 
that we are analyzing time-series cross-sectional data called for a number of methodological 
refinements.  In particular, the model is estimated with robust standard errors that are both 
corrected for problems of heteroscedasticity that are common to panel data and clustered at the 
state level to allow for serial correlation over time.  Because the linear probability model does not 
account for the binary nature of the dependent variable, we also estimated all specifications 
discussed below using a probit model.  When doing so, the results are in all cases almost identical to 
those from the linear probability model.  Unlike in the probit model, however, the coefficients from 
the linear probability model lend themselves to easy interpretation without further calculation.  The 
probit model with fixed effects moreover runs into the so-called incidental parameters problem.  
The probit results are available from the authors upon request.  See Ginsburg & Versteeg, supra 
note 106, at 20–43 (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of a linear probability model and 
probit model in the context of judicial review adoption).  For these reasons, we base our discussion 
below on the findings from the linear probability model. 
186. With this structure of the dependent variable, our model is an onset model aimed at explaining the 
act of adoption, rather than explaining whether countries retain the right to resist after adoption.  
See Goderis & Versteeg, supra note 2, at 15 (using an onset model to explain the adoption of 108 
constitutional rights provisions); Ginsburg & Versteeg, supra note 106, at 20 n.15 (using an onset 
model to explain judicial review adoption). 
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variables to test our main hypotheses: (1) a variable that captures whether any 
given country experienced a democratic transition within the past four years,187 
(2) a country’s level of democracy, as commonly measured in the quantitative 
political science literature,188 and (3) a variable that captures whether any given 
country experienced a coup within the past five years.189 
We also include a number of predictor variables to control for other possibly 
competing explanations for the right to resist: (4) a country’s level of economic 
development as measured by its energy consumption per capita, to control for the 
possibility that developed countries are simply more likely to adopt constitutional 
rights, including the right to resist;190 (5) the general political instability of the 
  
187. Our democratic transition variable comes from the Polity IV data set, which is widely used by 
political scientists.  The variable takes the value three in case of a “major democratic transition,” the 
value two in case of a “minor democratic transition,” and the value one in case of a “positive regime 
change.”  The variable also coded negative regime changes, but we recoded these as zero.  See 
MONTY G. MARSHALL & KEITH JAGGERS, POLITY IV PROJECT: POLITICAL REGIME 
CHARACTERISTICS AND TRANSITIONS, 1800–2006, at 35–36 (2011), available at http:// 
www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4manualv2010.pdf.  The four-year cutoff is motivated by the idea 
that constitutionmaking takes some time, and a newly democratic regime may take up to one 
electoral cycle to write a new constitution.  We also experimented with alternative thresholds and 
found that the democratic transitions variable is a positive and statistically significant predictor of 
the right to resist in the year the transition took place as well as up to eight years afterwards, thus 
suggesting that our results are not dependent on selecting a four-year threshold. 
188. Our measure of a country’s level of democracy is the polity2 variable from the Polity IV data set, 
which is also widely used by political scientists.  This variable ranges from +10 (strongly demo-
cratic) to –10 (strongly autocratic).  See id. at 15–16. 
189. The coup d’état data comes from Arthur S. Banks & Kenneth A. Wilson, Cross-National Time-
Series Data Archive, DATABANKS INT’L, http://www.databanksinternational.com/71.html (last 
visited Apr. 18, 2013).  The original variable captures the number of coups d’état in each year since 
1815.  We recode this variable such that it takes the value of one in the year a coup takes place, as 
well as in the five years thereafter, and takes the value zero in all other years.  The five-year cutoff is 
motivated by the idea that constitutionmaking takes some time, as coupmakers will only write a 
new constitution after they have control over the political situation, and want to further consolidate 
their rule.  Since the average constitutionmaking process takes less than two years complete, we 
suspect that the five-year cutoff will capture most constitutionmaking activity that follows coups.  
See Tom Ginsburg et al., Does the Process of Constitution-Making Matter?, 5 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. 
SCI. 201, 209 (2009) (documenting that “[o]n average, constitution-making took 16 months” in 
148 surveyed cases “with a standard deviation of 22 months”).  At the same time, it took about 
eight years for Salazar to be in the position to promulgate the 1933 Portuguese constitution, and we 
may miss some cases as a result of this decision.  To explore the extent to which our findings are 
dependent on selecting the five-year threshold, we also experimented with other thresholds, and 
found that the coup effect is also statistically significant for all thresholds from two to ten years.  In 
fact, the effect becomes larger and more significant for the seven-, eight-, and nine-year thresholds. 
190. Empirical studies have repeatedly found that wealthy countries tend to possess superior human 
rights practices.  See, e.g., Gerald J. Blasi & David Louis Cingranelli, Do Constitutions and 
Institutions Help Protect Human Rights?, in 4 HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
223, 225–26 (Stuart S. Nagel & David Louis Cingranelli eds., 1996).  Because data on GDP per 
capita is only available from the 1950s onwards, we use a measure on energy consumption in lieu of 
GDP per capita.  The data was created by J. David Singer et al., Capability Distribution, 
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country as measured by the total number of coups in a country’s history, to con-
trol for the possibility that it is simply societal instability that leads countries to 
adopt a right to resist;191 (6) the total proportion of the world’s constitutions that 
included a right to resist in the previous year, to control for global constitutional 
trends and the possibility that countries are simply emulating one another;192 and 
(7) the proportion of constitutions in the region that include a right to resist, to 
control for similar trends of a regional character.  We moreover include (8) a set 
of binary variables for each country, also known as fixed-effects, which serve as 
generic controls for all country characteristics that do not change over time.  
These fixed-effects capture things like stable cultural attitudes and other unique 
national features.  For example, fixed-effects would control for all those things 
that might make certain Asian countries less prone to constitutionally mandate 
rebellion than African and Latin American countries.  We finally include (9) a set 
of time trends to control for the possibility that the probability of adopting a right 
to resist simply increases with time.193 
Table 1 provides a summary of the results of this regression model.  
Variables marked with a single asterisk (*) are statistically significant predictors of 
constitutional underperformance at the p=0.10 level, while those marked with a 
double asterisk (**) are statistically significant at the p=0.05 level, and those 
marked with a triple asterisk (***) satisfy the most stringent p=0.01 level.  For the 
more technical reader, the full outputs of the results, such as the coefficients and 
standard errors, are reported in Appendix II. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820–1965, in PEACE, WAR, AND NUMBERS 19 (Bruce M. 
Russett ed., 1972).  We use the measure “energy”; it is computed using information about three 
broad categories of sources: petroleum, electricity, and natural gas, which is converted into one 
thousand metric coal-ton equivalents per capita for each country running from 1816 to 2007. 
191. This measure is simply the cumulative number of coups that occurred in a country.  The coup data 
were again taken from Banks & Wilson, supra note 189. 
192. See Law & Versteeg, supra note 2, at 1163–64 (characterizing constitutions as remarkably stan-
dardized documents).  Our construction of the regional trends variable follows the empirical liter-
ature in policy diffusion.  See, e.g., Goderis & Versteeg, supra note 2, at 23 (controlling for global 
trends in the “world polity”).  
193. Specifically, we added a linear time trend, the squared version of this time trend, and the cubed 
version of this time trend.  See David B. Carter & Curtis S. Signorino, Back to the Future: Modeling 
Time Dependence in Binary Data, 18 POL. ANALYSIS 271 (2010) (describing how this approach 
deals with time dependence in models with a binary dependent variables). 
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TABLE 1.  Summary of Empirical Results 
Variable Effect
Democratic Transition Positive ***
Coup in Last Five Years Positive **
Energy Consumption per Capita Insignificant
Global Adoption in Previous Year Negative **
Regional Adoption in Previous Year Insignificant
Number of Coups in Nation’s History Positive **
Democracy Positive ** 
Our findings are somewhat puzzling at first: Countries are more likely to 
enshrine a right to resist in their constitutions both after coups and during dem-
ocratic transitions.194  This finding is consistent with the idea that newly democratic 
countries might adopt these rights in hope of preventing undemocratic backsliding.  
More generally, we also find that a country’s level of democracy is a statistically 
significant predictor of the adoption of the right to resist.  All other things being 
equal, more democratic countries are more likely to enshrine such a right, which is 
consistent with the traditional conceptualization of the right as a forward-looking 
precommitment device serving as an enforcer of democratic rule.195  Yet even when 
controlling for actions of (newly) democratic nations, we also find that the right is 
associated with the actions of coupmakers and adopted in the aftermath of a coup 
d’état.196  Since coups and democratic transitions are events that are largely mutually 
exclusive, it seems plausible that there is some nonlinearity in the data: Some 
countries are attracted to the forward-looking version of the right to resist during or 
after a democratic transition, while others are attracted to the backward-looking 
version after a coup d’état.  We explore this issue in some detail below. 
Some of our control variables also turn out to be statistically significant pre-
dictors of right-to-resist adoption.  In particular, our measure of general political 
instability, as measured by the number of coups d’état in a country’s history, is also a 
statistically significant predictor of the right to resist.197  All other things being 
  
194. In fact, during such a democratic transition, the probability of adopting the right to resist increases 
by 1.54 percentage points.  This effect is statistically significant at the p=0.01 confidence level. 
195. In fact, a one-point increase in the twenty-point democracy scale increases the probability of 
adopting a right to resist by 0.006 percentage points.  This means that if a hypothetical country 
would move from being fully autocratic to fully democratic, the probability of adoption would 
increase by 0.12 percentage points. 
196. In fact, in each of the five years after a coup, the probability of adopting the right to resist increases 
by 0.86 percentage points.  This effect is statistically significant at the p=0.05 confidence level. 
197. In fact, for every coup a nation has ever experienced, the probability of adopting the right to resist 
increases by 0.13 percentage points in each year.  This effect is statistically significant at the p=0.05 
confidence level. 
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equal, unstable political systems are more likely to adopt this right.  This finding is 
perhaps unsurprising, as political instability is likely to trigger both of our core 
hypotheses: Past instability makes newly democratic regimes more likely to want 
to prevent undemocratic backsliding, and it probably also makes coupmakers 
more likely to want to justify their actions.  It is also possible, however, that cau-
sality runs the other way, and that constitutional systems that include a right to 
resist experience more instability. 
We do not find any evidence of positive global or regional trends, or of the 
idea that countries would be influenced by the actions of others.  The variable that 
captures previous adoption by other countries in the same region is not a sta-
tistically significant predictor of the right to resist, while the variable that captures 
previous adoption by all other countries in the world is actually negative, sug-
gesting that the more countries adopt the right, the less likely others are to follow.  
Whatever the myriad factors that incentivize constitutionmakers to adopt a par-
ticular right, they do not include simply following the pack and copying global 
trends.  Finally, we also find no relationship between economic development and 
right-to-resist adoption. 
B. How and Why Is Latin America Different? 
We next explore the implication that some countries may be more attracted 
to the right to resist during democratic transitions, while others adopt it after a 
coup.  One potential explanation, highlighted by the figures presented in the pre-
vious Part, is that there are important regional differences in propensities to adopt 
the right to resist.198  As Figure 2 illustrates, some regions refrained from adopting 
the right altogether, while in others it emerged as early as the nineteenth century.199  
To explore whether there are regional differences in the way in which the right is 
adopted, we divide our data into different regional subgroups to test whether the 
same model described above produces different results for different regions.200 
Our main finding from this exercise concerns Latin America.  Latin 
American nations are much more likely to adopt the right to resist after a coup 
  
198. We also explored other possible explanations, in particular whether internal variation in how the 
right to resist is written may explain the different circumstances under which it is adopted, but we 
did not find any evidence to support this hypothesis.  The number of cases is sufficiently low that 
conventional statistical significance may be difficult to obtain. 
199. See supra Figure 2. 
200. We define the following regions: (1) South Asia; (2) East Asia, the Pacific, and Oceania; (3) Central 
and Eastern Europe and Central Asia; (4) Sub-Saharan Africa; (5) North Africa and the Middle 
East; (6) Latin America and the Caribbean; and (7) Western Europe and North America.  These 
classifications were borrowed from Paul Collier & Benedikt Goderis, Commodity Prices and Growth: 
An Empirical Investigation, 56 EUR. ECON. REV. 1241, 1244 (2012). 
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d’état.201  Table 2 compares the findings for Latin America to those of the rest of 
the world, while full regression results are reported in Appendix II.202  The com-
parison suggests that while democratic transitions are associated with right-to-
resist adoption both in Latin America and beyond, coups are associated with the 
right to resist in Latin America only.203  Thus, our overall finding that the right to 
resist may serve as backward-looking legitimation for coupmakers appears to be 
driven by this (rather substantial) subset of our data.204 
 
TABLE 2.  Summary of Empirical Results 
Variable Latin America Rest 
Democratic Transition Positive * Positive ** 
Democracy Insignificant Positive * 
Coup in Last Four Years Positive *** Insignificant 
Energy Consumption per Capita Positive *** Insignificant 
Global Adoption in Previous Year Negative * Insignificant 
Regional Adoption in Previous Year Insignificant Insignificant 
Number of Coups in Nation’s History Insignificant Positive * 
 
There are different possible interpretations for this finding.  One is simply 
that Latin American constitutionalism has always been characterized by instability 
and dictatorship, thus providing Latin American nations with a fertile ground to 
reinvent the right to resist differently from its traditional conceptualizations in 
political theory.205  Another explanation is that Latin American constitutionalism 
has always had its own distinct trajectory that started long before constitution-
  
201. We also found that in some regions neither variable had any statistically significant effect at all, 
presumably because there were hardly any cases of right-to-resist adoption. 
202. The following countries are considered part of the Latin America region for purposes of this 
analysis: Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, 
and Venezuela.  Limiting the sample to Latin America reduces the number of country-year obser-
vations from 8176 to 1722.  The smaller sample is still large enough to allow us to reach statistical 
conclusions. 
203. In fact, after a coup d’état, the probability that a Latin American country adopts a right to resist 
increases by 2.2 percentage points in each year (as compared to 0.8 percentage points in the world 
at large). 
204. About 40 percent of all cases of right-to-resist adoption took place in Latin America. 
205. See, e.g., Keith S. Rosenn, The Success of Constitutionalism in the United States and Its Failure in Latin 
America: An Explanation, 22 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 1, 6–7, 27 (1990) (describing the 
instability of Latin America constitutionalism as shown by the fact that “since independence the 
twenty Latin American republics have promulgated some 253 constitutions, an average of 12.65 
per country” and discussing possible explanations for this, among them that “Latin America has 
been slow in developing institutions to check the arbitrary abuse of executive power”). 
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alism in most of the rest of the world, a constitutionalism that was often char-
acterized by extensive borrowing from other nations, particularly the United 
States and other Latin American countries.206  Dictators may have drawn inspiration 
from one another, causing certain rights to spread throughout Latin America.  As 
part of a distinct Latin American constitutional trajectory, Latin American countries 
have developed a form of regional hyper-constitutionalism, and this may lead to 
more numerous and ambitious changes in constitutions generally which, when 
taken in conjunction with the fact that the right to resist is rarely removed from 
subsequent rewrites after an initial introduction, may prove decisive.207  Finally, as 
yet another explanation, the fact that all Latin American countries operate in the 
civil law legal tradition, rather than the common law legal tradition,208 may make 
them more likely to embrace a conception of the right to resist that is different 
from its traditional conception in political theory. 
This latter possibility may require some further explanation.  There are nu-
merous important differences between the common and civil law legal traditions, 
most of which have been thoroughly documented in the literature.209  One of 
these differences, specifically in the constitutional realm in which the boundaries 
between the traditions are less clear,210 concerns the seemingly competing tradi-
  
206. See, e.g., GEORGE ATHAN BILLIAS, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM HEARD ROUND THE 
WORLD, 1776–1989: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 105 (2009) (noting that some “Latin American 
constitutionalists . . . emulate[d] North American ideas and institutions,” even copying “word for 
word from the U.S. Constitution”); Zachary Elkins, Constitutional Networks, in NETWORKED 
POLITICS: AGENCY, POWER, AND GOVERNANCE 43, 43 (Miles Kahler ed., 2009) (“Legend has 
it that some Latin American constitutions in the 1800s shared not only the same provisions but 
also the same typographical errors.”). 
207. See Daniel Lansberg-Rodriguez, Wiki-Constitutionalism, NEW REPUBLIC (May 25, 2010), http:// 
www.tnr.com/article/politics/75150/wiki-constitutionalism (“The Dominican Republic has had 
32 separate constitutions since its independence in 1821.  Venezuela follows close behind with 26, 
Haiti has had 24, Ecuador 20, and Bolivia recently passed its seventeenth.  In fact, over half of the 
21 Latin American nations have had at least ten constitutions while, in the rest of the world, only 
Thailand (17), France (16), Greece (13), and Poland (10) have reached double digits.”). 
208. See JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ROGELIO PÉREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: 
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 3 (3d ed. 
2007) (noting that the civil law tradition is “the dominant legal tradition in Europe” and “all of 
Latin America”). 
209. The common law system is usually characterized by a reliance on case law and precedent; an adver-
sarial system of criminal procedure; and a high profile judiciary that emphasizes the individual 
judge.  The civil law system, in contrast, is said to rely heavily on codes, especially the civil code; 
uses an inquisitorial system of criminal procedure; and employs judges in a hierarchical bureaucratic 
structure.  See generally id. at 1–90 (offering an introduction to the basics of the civil law tradition). 
210. See Lorraine E. Weinrib, The Postwar Paradigm and American Exceptionalism, in THE 
MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS 84, 89–90 (Suijt Choudhry ed., 2006) (describing the 
post-war paradigm of constitutional protection of equal citizenship and human dignity, enforced 
through judicial review and how “[t]his shared remedial project has broken down hitherto imper-
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tional conceptualizations of the social contract.211  In particular, within the com-
mon law tradition, the Lockean social contract is of more limited scope, wherein 
a people delegate certain well-defined powers to their government but retain a 
residual power that can be used to overthrow the government.212  In the civil law 
tradition, however, which draws far more from the writings of Jean Jacques 
Rousseau than from Locke,213 the social contract is all encompassing, and people 
surrender individual preference to the general will and the common good.214  
These different conceptions of the social contract go hand in hand with different 
ideas about the appropriate role of government in society.  A line of research sug-
gests that common law countries tend to be characterized by a smaller govern-
ment,215 a more libertarian conception of rights,216 and a stronger belief in the free 
market than civil law countries.217  As such, the common law tradition fits much 
better with the traditional conceptualization of the right to resist in political theory 
than the civil law tradition.  As a result, constitutionmakers within the civil law 
tradition, whose thoughts may lean more toward Rousseau than Locke, may find it 
easier to reject the traditional conceptualization of this right and give it a new meaning. 
Ultimately, all of these explanations rest on some degree of speculation.  It is 
not possible at this stage to say with any certainty why Latin American nations 
make different choices, though our instinct is that a pattern of intra-regional bor-
  
meable boundaries between separate sovereign legal systems and blurred hitherto sharp distinctions 
. . . between constitutions based on common law and those based on civil law”). 
211. For a brief overview see LESAFFER, supra note 118, at 387–92. 
212. See id. at 388. 
213. See, e.g., HAYEK, supra note 130, at 54–70 (describing the French and British traditions of liberty 
and how the French tradition is based on Rousseau while the British tradition is based on Locke); 
LESAFFER, supra note 118, at 392 (noting that Rousseau’s writings on the social contract had great 
impact on the French Revolution); Paolo G. Carozza, From Conquest to Constitutions: Retrieving a 
Latin American Tradition of the Idea of Human Rights, 25 HUM. RTS. Q. 281, 300 (2003) (noting that 
the Latin American constitutional tradition is influenced by Rousseau and therefore emphasizes 
not only liberty but also equality and duties). 
214. The French Declaration, for example, states that “[l]aw is an expression of the common will” and 
that “[s]ocial distinctions shall be based solely upon the public utility.”  DECLARATION OF THE 
RIGHTS OF MAN AND OF THE CITIZEN OF 26 AUGUST 1789 arts. 1, 6 (Fr.), translated in 2 
NIJHOFF, supra note 8, at 20–21. 
215. See Rafael La Porta et al., The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, 46 J. ECON. LITERATURE 
285, 286 (2008) (noting that “civil law is associated with a heavier hand of government ownership 
and regulation than common law” and that “common law is associated with lower formalism of 
judicial procedures”). 
216. See Law & Versteeg, supra note 2, at 1164 (arguing for the existence of a libertarian constitutional 
tradition of negative liberty and judicial process rights that is associated with the common law tra-
dition and a statist constitutional tradition of positive social welfare rights, family rights, and duties 
that is associated with the civil law tradition). 
217. See, e.g., Mahoney, supra note 109, at 504 (“English common law developed as it did because 
landed aristocrats and merchants wanted a system of law that would provide strong protections for 
property and contract rights and limit the Crown’s ability to interfere in markets.”). 
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rowing is a powerful determinant.  Many things may set Latin America apart from 
the rest of the world, and some of these attributes may be shared with other coun-
tries outside of this region.  At the same time, we can say with some certainty that 
the right to resist is not only associated with democratic regimes but is also a tool 
for coupmakers.  As such, the right is thus both democratic and undemocratic at 
the same time.  Which of the motivations for this right prevails, however, depends 
on the polity that adopted it. 
VI. THE RIGHT TO RESIST IN PRACTICE 
One question that this Article has not directly addressed, but that represents 
an important direction for future research, is whether right-to-resist provisions 
actually make a difference in practice.  In some cases, introducing the right to 
resist as an ex post justification may prove something of a Faustian bargain for the 
would-be autocrat.  Even when such a provision might accomplish the goal of 
legitimating the ruler in the short term, these provisions may in time be invoked 
by enemies of the regime and prove instrumental to the weakening or overthrow 
of their creators—a constitutional equivalent to Dr. Frankenstein’s monster.  In 
other cases in which the right to resist is adopted to constrain the future, it may 
actually do so in practice.  Regardless of its justification, smart political opponents 
may be able to use the right against the regime that adopted it. 
Consider the following events.  In 1953, a young Cuban lawyer named Fidel 
Castro was arrested for organizing an armed attack on a military enclave.218  In 
the court proceedings that followed his arrest, Castro predicated his defense on 
the constitutionally protected right to rebel, which had itself been enshrined into 
Batista’s new constitution as a justification for overthrowing the previous govern-
ment.219  Castro’s speech itself was subsequently published as an influential pamph-
let titled History Will Absolve Me and included the following passage: “Cuba is 
suffering from a cruel and base despotism.  You are well aware that resistance to 
despots is legitimate.  This is a universally recognized principle and our 1940 
Constitution expressly makes it a sacred right, in the second paragraph of Article 
40.”220  Castro succeeded in harnessing his legal knowledge and personal charis-
ma, turning his defense into a searing and very public indictment of the excesses 
  
218. See MARJORIE S. ZATZ, PRODUCING LEGALITY: LAW AND SOCIALISM IN CUBA 123 (1994) 
(discussing how Fidel Castro’s professional training in law “helped him prepare his eloquent self-
defense following his arrest in 1953 for the rebel raid on the Moncada Barracks”). 
219. See ANTONIO RAFAEL DE LA COVA, THE MONCADA ATTACK: BIRTH OF THE CUBAN 
REVOLUTION 230 (2007) (discussing Castro’s trial and legal defense following the Moncada attack). 
220. Fidel Castro, Speech in His Defense at Trial: History Will Absolve Me (Oct. 16, 1953), available at 
http://www.marxists.org/history/cuba/archive/castro/1953/10/16.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2012). 
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of the ruling regime.221  While eventually found guilty in a split 2–1 decision, 
Castro’s trial and two years’ imprisonment were instrumental in elevating the 
young rebel into an international figure.222 
Left-wing and right-wing governments may find that the right to resist has 
unintended consequences.  When, in 2002, the historically divided and ineffective 
Venezuelan opposition unexpectedly found itself poised to overthrow the Hugo 
Chavez regime following a brutal crackdown on peaceful protesters, the president 
expressed concern that Article 350 of the 1999 Constitution, whose drafting and 
inclusion he had overseen himself, might be used as justification for removing 
him.223  These fears proved prescient when, with over one million protesters 
amassed outside the Miraflores presidential palace in Caracas, the Venezuelan 
armed forces began to abandon Chavez.  General Efraín Vásquez Velasco, the 
first among the top brass to do so, explained his decision as follows: “Mister 
President, I was loyal until the end, but the violation of human rights and the 
killing that took place today cannot be tolerated.  I evoke articles, 25, 328 and 350 
of the Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela which oblige me to 
make this decision.”224 
An ocean away in Ghana, an entrenched Jerry Rawlings struggled to main-
tain de facto control of a rapidly liberalizing nation early in 2000.  The consti-
tutional right to resist, introduced by Rawlings’s government itself following its 
unconstitutional seizure of power, cropped up unexpectedly to frustrate a coup.  
As reported by Thomas Friedman for the New York Times, following Rawlings’s 
removal from office: 
“On the day of the elections there was a polling station in Accra where 
soldiers started destroying voting boxes,” recalled Joseph Ebo Quarshie, 
president of the Ghana Bar Association.  “Immediately, someone called 
an FM station and it was reported on the air.  I was at my bank at the 
time.  A guy walks up to me, a pharmacist I know, and says, ‘Have you 
heard what’s going on at this polling station in Accra?  What is the Bar 
  
221. See DE LA COVA, supra note 219, at 230 (describing the transformation of History Will Absolve Me 
into the “manifesto of the Cuban Revolution” and explaining its condemnation of the Batista regime’s 
“Tenth of March Coup” and military “brutality”). 
222. See BENJAMIN KEEN & KEITH HAYNES, A HISTORY OF LATIN AMERICA 389 (8th ed. 2009) 
(discussing Castro’s reputational enhancement following the Moncada attack trial, defense, and 
imprisonment). 
223. See BRIAN A. NELSON, THE SILENCE AND THE SCORPION: THE COUP AGAINST CHÁVEZ 
AND THE MAKING OF MODERN VENEZUELA 24 (2009) (noting Chavez’s worry that “the 
opposition, invoking article 350 of the new constitution, [could] force him from office” relying on 
popular feelings that “his regime was ‘contrary to the values, principals [sic] and democratic ideals 
of the country’”). 
224. Id. at 133 (quoting Efraín Vasquez Velasco). 
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Association doing about it?’  So I got in my car and turned on SKY 
FM.  Minutes later I got a call from JOY FM.  I told them to call me 
back in a few minutes.  Meanwhile, I got a copy of the Constitution.  
JOY FM called me back and I read over the radio the article in the 
Constitution which says that citizens had the right to resist interfer-
ence in a polling station.  JOY FM kept playing my interview over and 
over.  A couple of hours later the soldiers were chased off by voters.”225 
Rawlings’s handpicked successor lost the election, and a new era for democratic 
Ghana began.226 
When the right to resist is adopted to constrain the future, it may also have 
important real-world consequences.  In February 2012, the first democratically 
elected president of the Maldives, Mohamed Nasheed, resigned from office after 
losing the support of the nation’s powerful police force.227  Nasheed had been 
elected under a constitutional system that was adopted in 2008 in the wake of a 
thirty-year dictatorship that preceded it.  This constitution provided for a right 
both for the citizenry and for the national security services to resist illegal orders.228  
These provisions reflected what we have called the forward-looking logic of the 
right, designed to protect against democratic backsliding.  Interestingly, they were 
first used against Nasheed himself, though it was his political allies that had ar-
gued for the adoption of these provisions in the first place.229  Yet when Nasheed 
found himself frustrated by an opposition-controlled parliament and turned 
increasingly to unconstitutional tactics, including the arrest of opponents in defi-
ance of court orders, he found himself on the wrong end of the right.  A series of es-
calating protests in early 2012 led to increasing police frustration, and on February 
7, invoking the constitution, police called for Nasheed’s resignation.  Dictators, 
it seems, are not the only ones who find that the right to resist is a double-edged 
sword. 
  
225. Thomas L. Friedman, Foreign Affairs; Low-Tech Democracy, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2001, http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2001/05/01/opinion/foreign-affairs-low-tech-democracy.html. 
226. Id. (discussing how FM radios helped “J. A. Kufuor, a free-market democrat, to defeat Mr. Rawlings’s 
tired, floundering party” in the December 2000 elections). 
227. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF NATIONAL INQUIRY, MALDIVES (2012), available at http:// 
dhirls.net/DhiRLS/ebooks/CONI-Report%20(2012)%20eBook-DhiRLS.pdf. 
228. CONST. art. 64 (Maldives), translated in FUNCTIONAL TRANSLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 
OF THE REPUBLIC OF MALDIVES 2008 (Dheena Hussain trans., 2008) (“No employee of the 
State shall impose any orders on a person except under authority of a law.  Everyone has the right 
not to obey an unlawful order.”); id. art. 245 (“No person shall give an illegal order to a member of 
the security services.  Members of the security services shall not obey a manifestly illegal order.”). 
229. Interview with Mohamed Didi, Member of Maldives Constitutional Drafting Commission, in 
Sing. (Aug. 19, 2012). 
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These anecdotes suggest that the right to resist can be a dangerous one for au-
tocrats who invoke it to justify their rule.  Even when it is not adopted to constrain 
the future but to legitimate the past, the right to resist may motivate regime op-
ponents later on.  Such opponents must overcome formidable collective action 
problems: They must agree on what behavior constitutes a legitimate trigger for 
protest, and they must coordinate the place and timing of group action.  The 
right to resist provides clear language around which citizens can coordinate their 
behavior. 
The dissidents of the Arab Spring were able to throw off their regimes de-
spite a complete absence of institutional support or constitutional validation.  
When Mohamed Bouazizi, the Tunisian street vendor, set himself on fire fol-
lowing the confiscation of his peddling merchandise, he acted primarily in re-
sponse to personal humiliation rather than as a catalyst for regime change.230  Yet 
his act of self-sacrifice served as a tipping point, uniting alienated Arab popu-
lations and providing a rallying point for overcoming the severe collective action 
challenges.  At their best, constitutional right-to-resist provisions seek to trigger 
similar results without necessitating this level of uncommonly dramatic sacrifice. 
Within this international context, the importance of understanding the rise 
of constitutional provisions that actually mandate this kind of action—the right 
to resist—could not be greater.  Hopefully, this study will draw attention to the 
existence and possible importance of these mechanisms and begin a timely, 
scholarly conversation on the subject. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article seeks to understand the origins and spread of the right to resist.  
Drawing on original data, based on the coding of all written constitutions adopted 
since 1781, we find that no less than 20 percent of all constitutions today contain 
some version of the right to resist and that there has been a marked increase in the 
introduction of this right during recent decades. 
As to the question of why it is, exactly, that constitutionmakers would will-
ingly empower their people to overthrow the government in the first place, we set 
forth two possible explanations.  First, and in line with a longstanding tradition in 
political theory, we theorize that the right to resist is adopted as a forward-
looking democratic precommitment device that enables the people to act as the 
  
230. Rania Abouzeid, Bouazizi: The Man Who Set Himself and Tunisia on Fire, TIME, Jan. 21, 2011, 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2044723,00.html (quoting Bouazizi’s mother 
as saying, “Mohammed did what he did for the sake of his dignity” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
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ultimate enforcer of democratic rule.  Second, and perhaps more troubling, we 
speculate that this right might actually be fundamentally undemocratic and adopt-
ed as a backward-looking legitimation of the action of coupmakers.  When test-
ing these theories against each other, we found empirical evidence to support 
both: Countries are more likely to adopt the right to resist in democratic regimes 
and in the aftermath of both democratic transitions and coups d’état.  Which of 
the two explanations prevails depends on the national context and is open to 
some speculation, although we found some evidence that it is mainly the coun-
tries in Latin America that adopt this right after a coup d’état. 
Our finding that the right to resist can serve two quite different purposes 
goes some way toward advancing our understanding of constitutions in a broader 
sense.  The common belief is that constitutions are typically adopted to bind the 
future on behalf of the present.  Yet our findings show that, in some cases, they 
also function as a reinterpretation or justification of the past.  This function is 
largely foreign to constitutional theory today, even though it fits with an older 
constitutional tradition that predates Enlightenment thought.  Our findings 
suggest that this older tradition is still of empirical relevance today and that 
contemporary constitutional theory should perhaps pay more attention to this 
backward-looking, historically oriented role of constitutions. 
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APPENDIX I: FULL TEXT OF ALL (HISTORICAL) CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT-
TO-RESIST PROVISIONS 
Adopted Lasted Until Full Text of the Relevant Provision(s) 
Algeria 
1976 Current 
Article 27: Algeria associates itself with all the peoples fighting 
for their political and economic liberation, for the right of self-
determination and against any racial discrimination. 
Article 33: Individual or associative defense of the fundamental 
human rights and individual and collective liberties is guaranteed. 
Argentina 
1956 Current 
Article 36: This Constitution shall remain in force even if its 
observance is interrupted by acts of force against the institu-
tional order and the democratic system.  Such acts shall be ir-
revocably void.   
. . . . 
Those who, as a consequence of these acts, were to assume 
the powers foreseen for the authorities of this Constitution or 
for those of the provinces shall be punished with the same pen-
alties and shall be civil and criminally liable for their acts.  The 
respective actions shall not be subject to prescription. 
All citizens have the right to oppose resistance to those 
committing the acts of force described in this section. 
Armenia 
2005 Current 
Article 18: Everyone shall have a right to protect his/her 
rights and freedoms by any means not prohibited by the 
law. 
Azerbaijan 
1995 Current 
Article 54 (2): Every citizen of the Azerbaijan Republic has the 
right to independently show resistance to the attempt of a mu-
tiny against the State or forced change of the constitutional 
order.
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Adopted Lasted Until Full Text of the Relevant Provision(s) 
Benin 
1990 Current 
Article 66: In case of a coup d’état, of a putsch, of aggression by 
mercenaries or of any action by force whatsoever, any member 
of a constitutional agency shall have the right and the duty to 
make an appeal by any means in order to re-establish the con-
stitutional legitimacy, including recourse to existing agree-
ments of military or defense co-operation.  In these circum-
stances for any Beninese to disobey and organize himself to 
put a check to the illegitimate authority shall constitute the 
most sacred of rights and the most imperative of duties.  
Burkina 
Faso 1991 Current 
Article 167: The source of all legitimacy arises from the 
present Constitution.   
All power which does not take its source from this Con-
stitution, notably those stemming from a coup d’état or from 
a putsch, shall be illegal.  In this case, the right to civil disobe-
dience shall be recognized to all the citizens.
Cape 
Verde 
1996 
Current 
Article 18: Any citizen shall have the right not to obey any 
order that offends his right, liberties and guarantees and to 
resist by force any illegal aggression, when the recourse to the 
public authority is not possible.
Chad 
1996 Current 
Preamble: We the Chadian people: . . .  
. . . . 
—Proclaim solemnly our right and duty to resist and 
disobey any individual or group of individuals, any corps 
of State that would assume power by force or would ex-
ercise it in violation of the present Constitution; 
—Affirm our total opposition to any regime whose poli-
cy would be founded on the arbitrariness, dictatorship, 
injustice, corruption, extortion, nepotism, clanism, trib-
alism, confessionalism, or confiscation of power;  
. . .  
. . . Adopt solemnly the present Constitution as the su-
preme law of the State.   
This Preamble is an integral part of the Constitution. 
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Adopted Lasted Until Full Text of the Relevant Provision(s) 
Congo 
(Brazzaville) 
1992 
2002 
Preamble: [Proclaim] The right and obligation of every citizen 
to resist by civil disobedience upon the default of other re-
courses, no matter what enterprise to overthrow the consti-
tutional regime, to take power by a coup d’état or exercise in a 
tyrannical manner.
Congo 
(DR) 
2005 
Current 
Article 64: All Congolese have the duty to oppose any indivi-
dual or group of individuals who seize power by force or who 
exercise it in violation of the provisions of this Constitution. 
Cuba 
1940 1959 
Article 40: Legal or administrative provisions, or those of any 
other kind, which regulate the exercise of the rights which 
this Constitution guarantees, shall be null if they diminish, 
restrict, or impair them.  Adequate resistance for the protec-
tion of the individual rights above guaranteed is legitimate. 
The right of action to prosecute infractions of this Title 
is public, without surety or formality of any kind, and by a 
simple denunciation. 
The enumeration of the rights guaranteed in this Title 
does not exclude the others that this Constitution establishes, 
or others of analogous nature or that are derived from the 
principle of the sovereignty of the people and from the repub-
lican form of government.
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Adopted Lasted Until Full Text of the Relevant Provision(s) 
Cuba 
1972 Current 
Article 3: In the Republic of Cuba sovereignty lies in the 
people, from whom originates all the power of the state.  That 
power is exercised directly or through the assemblies of People’s 
Power and other state bodies which derive their authority from 
these assemblies, in the form and according to the norms es-
tablished in the Constitution and by law. 
When no other recourse is possible, all citizens have the 
right to resist through all means, including armed struggle, 
anyone who tries to overthrow the political, social and eco-
nomic order established in this Constitution. 
Socialism, as well as the revolutionary political and social 
system established by this Constitution, has been forged dur-
ing years of heroic resistance to the aggression of every kind 
and economic war waged by the governments of the most 
powerful imperialist states that have ever existed; it has dem-
onstrated its ability to transform the nation and create an 
entirely new and just society, and is irrevocable: Cuba will 
never revert to capitalism. 
Article 12: The Republic of Cuba espouses the principles of 
anti-imperialism and internationalism, and  
(a) ratifies its aspirations to a valid, true and dignified 
peace for all states, big or small, weak or powerful, based 
on respect for the independence and sovereignty of the 
peoples and the right to self-determination;  
. . . . 
(g) categorizes the war of aggression and conquest as an 
international crime, recognizes the legitimacy of strug-
gles for national liberation, as well as armed resistance to 
aggression, and considers its internationalist obligation 
to support those attacked and [stand] with the peoples 
who fight for their liberation and self-determination . . . . 
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Adopted Lasted Until Full Text of the Relevant Provision(s) 
Czech 
Republic 
1993 
Current 
Article 23: Citizens have the right to put up resistance to any 
person who would do away with the democratic order of hu-
man rights and fundamental freedoms established by this 
Charter, if the actions of constitutional institutions or the ef-
fective use of legal means have been frustrated.
Dominican 
Republic 
1963 
1966 
Article 81: Declared legitimate is resistance directed toward 
the protection of human rights detailed above, which do not 
exclude such others as this Constitution establishes, nor others 
of—the same nature or that may result from the sovereignty 
of the—people and of the democratic regime.
Dominican 
Republic 
1966 
Current 
Article 8(5): No person is obligated to comply with what is not 
required by law; nor can they legitimately be impeded from 
actions not prohibited by law. 
Article 46: All laws, decrees, resolutions, regulations or acts are 
null and void if contrary to the rights in this constitution.   
Article 99: All usurped State Authority is null.
Ecuador 
1978 1998 
Article 4: The Ecuadoran State condemns all forms of coloni-
alism, neocolonialism and racial discrimination or segregation.  
It recognizes the right of peoples to liberate themselves from 
these oppressive systems.
Ecuador 
1998 2008 
Article 4(6): [Ecuador] rejects all forms of colonialism, neoco-
lonialism, and discrimination and recognizes the right of the 
people for self-determination and freedom from oppressive 
systems.
Ecuador 
2008 Current 
Article 98: Individuals and groups may exercise the right of 
resistance against acts or omissions of public authorities, per-
sons or legal entities that may violate or infringe their consti-
tutional rights, and demand the recognition of new rights. 
Article 416(8): The Ecuadoran State condemns all forms of 
colonialism, neocolonialism and racial discrimination or segre-
gation.  It recognizes the right of peoples to liberate themselves 
from these oppressive systems.
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Adopted Lasted Until Full Text of the Relevant Provision(s) 
El 
Salvador 
1886 
1945 
Article 8: Salvador recognizes rights and obligations anterior 
and superior to the positive laws, derived from the principles 
of liberty, equality, and fraternity; and as fundamental bases, 
family ties, labor, property, and public order. 
Article 9: Every inhabitant of Salvador holds the incontestable 
right to preserve and defend his life, liberty, and property, and 
to freely dispose of his belongings in conformity with law. 
El 
Salvador 
1945 
1950 
Article 36: The right of insurrection shall produce in no case 
the abrogation of the laws, and its effects shall be limited to 
removing, as may prove necessary, the government officials 
who exercise authority, and appointing pro tempore those who 
shall fill their places until the regular appointments are made 
in the manner established by the Constitution.
El 
Salvador 
1950 
1983 
Article 5: The succession of the presidency is essential to the 
maintenance of the form of the established government.  The 
violation of this standard shall oblige an insurrection. 
Article 175: The right to insurrection, which the Constitution 
recognizes, in no case may produce the abrogation of laws; it 
is limited in its separatory effects, when necessary, to officials, 
while it may be substituted it in the legal method.
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El 
Salvador 
1996 
Current 
Article 87: The right of the people to insurrection is recog-
nized, for the sole object of reestablishing constitutional order 
altered by the transgression of the norms relative to the form 
of government or to the established political system, or for 
serious violations of the rights consecrated in this Consti-
tution. 
The exercise of this right shall not produce the abroga-
tion nor the reform of this Constitution, and shall be limited 
to the removal insofar as necessary of transgressing officials, 
replacing them in a transitory manner until they are substi-
tuted in the form established by this Constitution.   
Under no circumstances shall the powers and jurisdic-
tions which correspond to the fundamental organs established 
by this Constitution be exercised by the same person or by a 
sole institution. 
Article 88: The principle that a President cannot succeed 
himself [alternabilidad] is indispensable for the maintenance 
of the established form of government and political system.  
Violation of this norm makes insurrection an obligation. 
Estonia 
1992 Current 
Article 54 (2): Where no other means are available, every 
Estonian citizen shall have the right to initiate spontaneous ac-
tion against any forcible change of the constitutional system. 
France 
1791 
1795; 
Reinstated 
1958–
(Current) 
Article 2: The aim of all political association is the preservation 
of the natural and imprescriptible rights of man.  These rights 
are liberty, property, security, and resistance to oppression. 
Germany 
1968 Current 
Article 20 (4): All Germans shall have the right to resist any 
persons seeking to abolish this constitutional order, if no other 
remedy is available. 
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Ghana 
1979 1992 
Article 1(3): All citizens of Ghana shall have the right to resist 
any person or persons seeking to abolish the constitutional or-
der as established by this Constitution should no other reme-
dy be possible.
Ghana 
1992 Current 
Article 3(4): All citizens of Ghana shall have the right and duty 
at all times— 
(a) to defend this Constitution, and in particular, to resist 
any person or group of persons seeking to commit any of 
the acts referred to in clause (3) of this article; and  
(b) to do all in their power to restore this Constitution af-
ter it has been suspended, overthrown, or abrogated as 
referred to in clause (3) of this article.   
Article 3(5): Any person or group of persons who suppresses or 
resists the suspension, overthrow or abrogation of this Con-
stitution as referred to in clause (3) of this article, commits no 
offence. 
Article 3(6): Where a person referred to in clause (5) of this 
article is punished for any act done under that clause, the pun-
ishment shall, on the restoration of this Constitution, be taken 
to be void from the time it was imposed and he shall, from that 
time, be taken to be absolved from all liabilities arising out of 
the punishment.  
Article 3(7): The Supreme Court shall, on application by or 
on behalf of a person who has suffered any punishment or loss 
to which clause (6) of this article relates, award him adequate 
compensation, which shall be charged on the Consolidated 
Fund, in respect of any suffering or loss incurred as a result of 
the punishment.
Greece 
1975 Current 
Article 120.4: Observance of the constitution is entrusted to 
the patriotism of the Greeks who shall have the right and the 
duty to resist by all possible means whoever attempts the vio-
lent abolition of the Constitution.
1250 60 UCLA L. REV. 1184 (2013) 
 
 
Adopted Lasted Until Full Text of the Relevant Provision(s) 
Guatemala 
1945 1965 
Article 50: Legal, governmental, or other provisions which 
regulate the exercise of the rights guaranteed by this Consti-
tution shall be null ipso jure if they diminish, restrain, or alter 
them.  Acts and contracts which violate constitutional stan-
dards shall also be null ipso jure. 
Adequate resistance for the protection of the individual 
rights above guaranteed is legitimate.  The action to prosecute 
infractions of the principles of this Title is public and may be 
brought without bond or formality of any kind by a simple 
denunciation.   
The enumeration of the rights guaranteed in this Title 
does not exclude others established by this Constitution or 
others or [sic] an analogous nature or which derive from the 
principle of the sovereignty of the people, the republican and 
democratic form of government, and the dignity of man. 
Guatemala 
1965 1982 
Article 77: The rights and guarantees granted by the Consti-
tution do not exclude others which, although not expressly 
indicated therein, are inherent in the human person. 
Laws and governmental orders or those of any other kind 
that regulate the exercise of rights guaranteed by the Consti-
tution shall be null and void ipso jure if they diminish, restrict, 
or distort such rights.
Guatemala 
1982 1985 
Preamble: . . . the Army of Guatemala, in fulfillment of its ob-
ligations to the Nation, echoing the feelings of the people and 
seeking to safeguard the national honor, deposed the ruling 
regime, the outgrowth of a system completely oblivious of le-
gality that brought the country into a state of anarchy and in-
ternational isolation which with disregard of human life, of 
honesty in the management of public affairs, and of the rights 
of citizens, culminated in an election vitiated by fraud. 
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Guatemala 
1985 Current 
Article 5: Any person has the right to do whatever the law does 
not prohibit; he is not obligated to obey orders not based on 
the law or issued according to it.  Neither can he be harassed or 
persecuted for his opinions or for acts that do not involve vio-
lation of same. 
Article 45: Action to prosecute the violators of human rights is 
public and can be exercised through a simple denunciation, 
without any guarantee or formality whatever.  The opposition 
of the people to protect and defend the rights and guarantees 
granted in the Constitution is legitimate.
Guinea 
1990 2010 
Article 19: The people of Guinea shall freely and sovereignly 
determine its institutions and the economic and social organ-
ization of the Nation.   
They shall have an inalienable right to its resources.  These 
shall benefit all the citizens in an equitable fashion.   
They shall have the right to the preservation of their heri-
tage, culture and environment.   
They shall have the right to resist oppression.
Guinea 
2010 Current 
Article 21: The people of Guinea shall freely and sovereignly 
determine its institutions and the economic and social organ-
ization of the Nation.   
They shall have an inalienable right to its resources.  These 
shall benefit all the citizens in an equitable fashion.   
They shall have the right to the preservation of their her-
itage, culture and environment.   
They shall have the right to resist oppression.
Honduras 
1957 1982 
Article 4: No immediate reelection (alternabilidad) in the ex-
ercise of the Presidency of the Republic is compulsory.  Vio-
lation of this rule gives the right to popular insurrection. 
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Honduras 
1982 Current 
Article 3: No one owes obedience to a usurping government 
nor to those who assume office or public service by force of arms 
or by using means or procedures which violate or ignore the 
provisions established by this Constitution and other laws.  The 
acts adopted by such authorities are null.  The people have the 
right to resort to insurrection in defense of the constitutional 
order.
Hungary 
2011 Current 
Article C: (1) The functioning of the Hungarian state is based 
on the principle of the separation of powers. (2) Nobody may 
direct their activity at the acquisition or exercise of public au-
thority by force, or seek its exclusive possession.  Everyone shall 
have the right and obligation to resist by lawful means such 
attempts.  (3) Only state authorities shall have the exclusive 
right to use force in order to enforce the Constitution and laws. 
Lithuania 
1992 Current 
Article 3: No one may limit or restrict the sovereignty of the 
People or make claims to the sovereign powers of the People.  
The People and each citizen shall have the right to oppose 
anyone who encroaches on the independence, territorial inte-
grity, or constitutional order of the State of Lithuania by force.  
Maldives 
2008 Current 
Article 64: No employee of the State shall impose any orders 
on a person except under authority of a law.  Everyone has the 
right not to obey an unlawful order. 
Article 245: No person shall give an illegal order to a member 
of the security services.  Members of the security services shall 
not obey a manifestly illegal order.
Mali 1992 Current 
Article 121: The foundation for every power of the Republic 
of Mali resides in the Constitution.  The republican form of 
the State may not be revised.  The people have the right to 
civil disobedience in order to preserve the republican form of 
the State.  Any coup d’Etat or putsch is a crime against the 
Malian People.
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Mexico 
1814 1917 
Article 14: . . . undeniable popular right . . . establish . . . alter, 
modify, or completely abolish the government, whenever nec-
essary for the people’s happiness. 
Mexico 
1917 Current 
Article 136: This Constitution shall not lose its force and ef-
fect, even it [sic] its observance is interrupted by rebellion.  In 
the event that a government whose principles are contrary to 
those that are sanctioned herein should become established 
through any public disturbance, as soon as the people recover 
their liberty, its observance shall be reestablished, and those 
who have taken part in the government emanating from the 
rebellion, as well as those who have cooperated with such persons, 
shall be judged in accordance with this Constitution and the 
laws that have been enacted by virtue thereof.  
Mozambique 
1990 Current 
Article 80: All citizens shall have the right not to comply with 
orders that are unlawful or that infringe on their rights, free-
doms and guarantees. 
Niger 
1992 1996 
Article 6: The people shall have the right and duty to resist an 
oppressive regime through civil disobedience.  Any regime that 
deliberately violates the carrying out of this present Constitution 
shall be considered an oppressive regime.  The people shall 
have the right to defend the established democratic regime 
against a coup d’etat through civil disobedience.  Civil disobe-
dience shall be exercised peacefully and only as a last resort. 
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Paraguay 
1992 Current 
Article 138: (1) Citizens are hereby authorized to resist usurp-
ers through every means available to them.  If a person or a 
group of persons, acting in the name of any principle or repre-
sentation contrary to this Constitution, was to seize public 
power, their action will be null, nonbinding, and of no value, 
and therefore, exercising their right to resist oppression, the 
people will be excused from having to comply with such ac-
tions.  (2) Those foreign states that, under any circumstance, 
cooperate with such usurpers will not be able to demand com-
pliance with any pact, treaty, or agreement signed with or 
authorized by an usurping government as if these were obli-
gations or commitments of the Republic of Paraguay.  
Peru 1979 1993 
Article 82: No one owes obedience to a usurping government 
nor to anyone who may assume public functions or positions 
in violation of the procedures which the Constitution and the 
laws establish.  The decrees of any usurped authority are void.  
The people have the right to rise in insurrection in defense of 
the constitutional order.
Peru 1993 Current 
Article 46: No one owes obedience to a usurper government or 
to anyone who assumes public office in violation of the 
Constitution and the law.  The civil population has the right 
to rise up in defense of the constitutional order.  The acts of 
those who usurp public office are null and void.
Portugal 
1933 1976 
Article 8: The following constitute the rights and individual 
guarantees of Portuguese citizens: (19) The right of resistance 
to any order which may infringe individual guarantees, unless 
they have been legally suspended, and of repelling by force pri-
vate aggression when recourse to public authority is impossible. 
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Portugal 
1976 1982 
Article 7: (3) Portugal recognizes the right of all peoples to re-
volt against all forms of oppression . . . . 
Article 20: (1) Everyone shall have access to the courts for the 
defense of his rights.  Justice shall not be withheld from a person 
for lack of financial means.  (2) Everyone shall have the right 
to resist any order that infringes his rights, freedoms or safeguards 
and to repel by force any form of aggression when recourse to 
public authority is impossible.
Portugal 
1989 Current 
Article 7: (3) Portugal recognizes the right of peoples to revolt 
against all forms of oppression. 
Article 21: Everyone shall have the right to resist any order that 
infringes his rights, freedoms or safeguards and to repel by force 
any form of aggression when recourse to public authority is 
impossible.
Rwanda 
2003 Current 
Article 48: In all circumstances, every citizen, whether civilian 
or military, has the duty to respect the Constitution, other laws 
and regulations of the country.  Every citizen has the right to 
defy orders received from his or her superior authority if the 
orders constitute a serious and manifest violation of human 
rights and public freedoms.
Slovakia 
1992 Current 
Article 32: Citizens have the right to put up resistance to 
anyone who would eliminate the democratic order of human 
rights and basic liberties listed in this Constitution, if the acti-
vity of constitutional bodies and the effective use of legal means 
are rendered impossible.
Thailand 
2007 Current 
Section 69: A person shall have the right to resist peacefully 
any act committed for the acquisition of the power to rule the 
country by a means which is not in accordance with the modes 
provided in this Constitution.
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Timor 
L’este 
2002 
Current 
Article 2: (3) The validity of the laws and other actions of the 
State depend upon their compliance with the Constitution. 
Section 28: (1) All citizens have the right to disobey and to re-
sist illegal orders or orders that affect their fundamental rights, 
freedoms and guarantees.  (2) The right to self-defense is guar-
anteed to all, in accordance with the law.
Togo 
1992 Current 
Article 45: All citizens have the duty to combat any person or 
group of persons who would try to change by force the demo-
cratic order established by this Constitution. 
Article 150: In case of a coup d’etat or other forcible coup, all 
members of the government and of the National Assembly 
shall have the right and the duty to take any and all means to 
reestablish constitutional legitimacy.  As a recourse, they may 
call upon any existing agreements of military or defense coop-
eration.  Under these circumstances, the duty of all Togolese 
to disobey and to organize themselves to check any illegiti-
mate power shall be their most sacred right and their most im-
perative duty.  Any overturning of the constitutional regime 
shall be considered an indefeasible crime against the nation, 
to be penalized according to laws of the Republic.
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Turkey 
1961 1982 
Preamble: Having enjoyed freedom, and fought for her rights 
and liberties throughout her history, and having achieved the 
Revolution of May 27, 1960 by exercising her right to resist 
the oppression of a political power which had deteriorated into 
a state of illegitimacy through behavior and actions contrary 
to the rule of law and the Constitution, the Turkish Nation, 
prompted and inspired by the spirit of Turkish nationalism, 
which unites all individuals, be it in fate, pride or distress, in a 
common bond as an indivisible whole around national con-
sciousness and aspirations, and which has as its aim always to 
exalt our nation in a spirit of national unity as a respected 
member of the community of the world of nations enjoying 
equal rights and privileges; With full dedication to the prin-
ciple of “peace at home, peace in the world” and with full 
dedication to the spirit of national independence, and sov-
ereignty and to the reforms of Atatürk; Guided by the desire 
to establish a democratic rule of law based on juridical and so-
cial foundations, which will ensure and guarantee human rights 
and liberties, national solidarity, social justice, and the wel-
fare and prosperity of the individual and society; Now therefore, 
the Turkish Nation hereby enacts and proclaims this Constitution 
drafted by the Constituent Assembly of the Turkish Republic, 
and entrusts it to the vigilance of her sons and daughters who 
are devoted to the concepts of freedom, justice and integrity, 
with the conviction that its basic guarantee lies in the hearts 
and minds of her citizens.
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Uganda 
1995 Current 
Article 3: . . . (3) This Constitution shall not lose its force and 
effect even where its observance is interrupted by a govern-
ment established by the force of arms; and in any case, as soon 
as the people recover their liberty, its observance shall be rees-
tablished and all persons who have taken part in any rebellion 
or other activity which resulted in the interruption of the 
observance, shall be tried in accordance with this Constitution 
and other laws consistent with it.  (4) All citizens of Uganda 
shall have the right and duty at all times—(a) to defend this 
Constitution and, in particular, to resist any person or group 
of persons seeking to overthrow the established constitutional 
order; and (b) to do all in their power to restore this Constitution 
after it has been suspended, overthrown, abrogated or amended 
contrary to its provisions.  (5) Any person or group of persons 
who, as required by clause (4) of this article, resists the sus-
pension, overthrow, abrogation or amendment of this Constitution 
commits no offense.  (6) Where a person referred to in clause 
(5) of this article is punished for any act done under that clause, 
the punishment shall, on the restoration of this Constitution, 
be considered void from the time it was imposed and that 
person shall be taken to be absolved from all liabilities arising 
out of the punishment.  
United 
Provinces 
of Rio de 
Plata 
1828 
(Uruguay, 
Argentina, 
Bolivia) 
Current 
Article 1: As all men are born free and equal, they possess 
certain natural rights, essential and inviolable, among them 
the right to enjoy and defend their lives and freedom; to ac-
quire, possess and protect their property and, finally, to seek 
and obtain their security and happiness . . . for which it is a 
responsibility of the state to secure those rights . . . and should 
the state fail to do so the people have a right to alter the gov-
ernment and take any actions necessary for restoring their 
security, prosperity and happiness.
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Uruguay 
1830 Current 
Article 130: The inhabitants of the State are entitled to be pro-
tected in the enjoyment of their life, honor, freedom, security 
and property.  No one can be deprived of these rights, but ac-
cording to law. 
Article 134: No inhabitant of the state will be forced to do 
what the law does not require, nor prevented from doing what 
it is [sic] not prohibited.
Venezuela 
1961 1999 
Article 250: This Constitution shall not lose its effect even if 
its observance is interrupted by force or it is repealed by means 
other than those provided herein.  In such eventuality, every 
citizen, whether or not vested with authority, has the duty to 
collaborate in the reestablishment of its effective validity.  
Those who are found responsible for the acts indicated in the 
first part of the preceding paragraph and also the principal of-
ficials of governments subsequently organized shall be judged 
in accordance with this Constitution itself and laws enacted in 
conformity therewith, if they have not contributed to the rees-
tablishment of its force and effect.  Congress may decree, by 
resolution approved by an absolute majority of its member, 
the confiscation of all or a part of the property of such persons 
and of those who have been unlawfully enriched under the 
protection of usurpation, in order to reimburse the Republic 
for damages incurred by it.
Venezuela 
1999 Current 
Article 333: This Constitution shall not cease to be in effect if 
it ceases to be observed due to acts of force or because or [sic] 
repeal in any manner other than as provided for herein.  In 
such eventuality, every citizen, whether or not vested with of-
ficial authority, has a duty to assist in bringing it back into ac-
tual effect. 
Article 350: The people of Venezuela, true to their republican 
tradition and their struggle for independence, peace and free-
dom, shall disown any regime, legislation or authority that 
violates democratic values, principles and guarantees or en-
croaches upon human rights.
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APPENDIX II: FULL REGRESSION RESULTS 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Full Sample Latin America Rest of World 
Coup in Last Four Years 0.00862** 0.02240*** –0.00063 (0.000) (0.007) (0.004) 
Democratic Transition  
in Last Four Years 
0.01540*** 0.01970* 0.01430** 
(0.006) (0.010) (0.007) 
Democracy 0.00060** 0.00062 0.00064* (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Energy Consumption 0.00000 0.00493*** 0.00000 (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) 
Global Adoption (t–1) –0.16500** –0.31700* –0.09630 (0.064) (0.173) (0.061) 
Regional Adoption (t–1) 0.01690 –0.07110 0.01790 (0.028) (0.125) (0.029) 
Coups Thus Far 0.00159*** 0.00081 0.00244* (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Time Trends Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8176 1722 6158 
R-squared 0.058 0.062 0.065 
Reported results are based on a fixed effects linear probability model.  Robust standard 
errors clustered at the country level are reported in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,  
* p<0.10. 
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